Clare Morgan, Media Relations Manager for the Objective One Partnership of Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly.
Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly are well known in the UK as a place for traditional bucket and spade holidays. British families have stayed in bed and breakfast accommodation and sunbathed on beaches.
This led to seasonal, low paid jobs and while the holiday image is known nationwide, the region as a place for successful business is a new message.
The message that the Objective One Partnership is tasked with getting across is that the region has a burgeoning knowledge-based economy as well as top quality food and drink producers.
The obstacles to relaying this message include distance; Cornwall is about five hours by road or train from London. National journalists will often not travel yet the best way to challenge preconceptions is by demonstrating the evidence.
Because the next generation of European funding is likely to be different the Partnership also wants to demonstrate that the region has handled its first round of Objective One investment wisely.
The theme is not only present successes but also the need for partnerships to work well in the future. We believe that Objective One has been used so effectively in our region because of the uniqueness of the Objective One Partnership.
The Objective One Partnership Office for Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly was created solely to work and speak for the Programme. It fulfils an essential role as the independent voice of the Programme, and has been crucial in ensuring common ownership across the region. It is the public face for the Programme.
This partly arose from the Objective 5b Programme, which ran until 1999. It was discovered that not enough communication had gone on and the people of the region did not feel involved and did not see investment benefits.
Partnership communication challenges include gaining high visibility regionally, nationally and across Europe. The partnership team needs to communicate to the media, programme partners and interested parties such as MEPs.
One of the main ways of doing this is by gathering and publicising evidence of successful projects ranging from the largest such as the Combined Universities in Cornwall to the smallest which can include buying a bicycle for someone out of work so they can get to a new job on time.
The Combined Universities in Cornwall is the region’s first and the Objective One flagship project. Because of this it has generated a lot of media interest. Publicity includes stories about its opening, about students working with businesses and about their achievements.
The main campus building is an iconic design and the Objective One Partnership hosted an architecture conference there in September. This was an excellent chance to demonstrate the concrete and visible difference O1 has been making. Speakers included Partnership Director Carleen Kelemen who could emphasise the people in the buildings who are working to increase the region’s knowledge and wealth.
Another great story opportunity to come from the university was Qemscan, a piece of machinery that analyses non-organic particles. The first to be installed in a university Qemscan is usually used by mining companies but, thanks to the imagination of professors at the CUC, its applications have expanded and several murderers have been convicted with the help of Qemscan forensic evidence analysis. The machinery is also being used on ancient archaeological remains and has spin out applications for many businesses. The fact that Qemscan is used in murder investigations immediately fascinated the media.
The CUC could be called a publicity dream because of its size and its intentions. The Hub is a purpose-built £50 million campus offering world-class facilities for up to 5,000 students. By 2010, the CUC will have created an additional 4,000 HE student places, producing 1,300 graduates a year and generating £32 million a year for Cornwall. It is expected to create an additional 1,000 jobs.
Its own team has been to Brussels to talk about the project. Even detractors of how Objective One money is being spent, particularly an economist who has long argued that the European money should not have gone to Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly, has no disagreement with the CUC.
The Knowledge Spa, which houses a part of a new medical school as well as business incubation units built with O1 investment is also an easy publicity target. The Partnership team is writing case studies of every business to become a tenant and undertook the publicity for a conference in May.
A project which aims to introduce locally sourced food and drink to hospitals is based at the Knowledge Spa. To celebrate Organic Week, organic breakfasts were served at Cornwall’s largest hospital. The partnership and hospital organised a media event which resulted in good coverage as well as building good relations with the media by giving them a free breakfast.
The Eden Project is another easy publicity target. The Project has its own press team and attracts worldwide attention with events such as the African part of Live Eight held this summer.
O1 money has been invested in the new education centre as well as a project to encourage local food sourcing and the Partnership communication team works side by side with Eden PRs to make sure the O1 name is prominent.
Eden is a great example to show visitors as its twin biomes are unique. In April this year a delegation of Swedish and Danish representatives, including Maria Evertsson, came to Cornwall to study Partnership communications. Eden was one of the places they were taken as it is such a visual demonstration of success.
Projects less easy to publicise often involve training. Many projects concentrate on trying to introduce or reintroduce people to work. Many of these people do not want publicity and this makes it difficult for the communication team when the question is raised – what has Objective One done for communities? Instead the team has to point to statistics or visible community regenerators such as restoration of historic buildings. This is a challenge as it is the people that the press are interested in.
Other methods the Partnership team uses to communicate messages include:
· Answering media inquiries both good and bad.
· Highlighting heroes because the press likes people.
· Working with project partners. EG: Cornwall County Council has been a major partner in investment for many O1 projects. The partnership and the council’s communications teams share events and add to each other’s press releases.
A major opportunity about to open up is in the form of businessman David Brewer. In November he will become Lord Mayor of the City of London. He has strong ties with Cornwall and has said he wants to promote the region as much as possible during his busy year. This will include serving Cornish food at official banquets. The Partnership is working closely with Mr Brewer and he has agreed to write his own articles for us.
There are various channels the Partnership uses to send out its message. One is our own Quarterly review. Themes for this small booklet have included business, food and drink, university and environment.
Other channels include newspapers; radio; TV; magazines; websites and presentations.
Stories that have sparked interest include one about a clothing store that is branching into organic cotton. The store received Objective One investment via Business Link, a business support organisation. This was published nationally in Drapers, a fashion trade magazine which that week chose an eye-catching front cover.
The Partnership has its own website – www.objectiveone.com- and all press releases are uploaded and the site has information for media, partners and potential applicants.
Partnership Director, Carleen Kelemen, spreads the message by giving interviews to the media and presentations to others.
Sometimes partners come up with opportunities for publicity themselves. In June Cornwall Pure Business, a project encouraging businesses to move to Cornwall, organised Cornwall Business Week. This received coverage on national television, radio and newspapers. One reporter was so interested he spent two days in Cornwall to see the effects O1 investment had really had. To generate this interest in what is seen is as a distant rural area is quite a coup.
On top of the success stories which need to be communicated two new messages have arrived. Because so much investment has gone on since the Objective One Programme began in 2000 the four funds are now almost committed. This means some applicants will be disappointed. This is now being weaved into press releases.
This leads onto the second emerging message - Post 2006. While the region believes Objective One will be followed by some form of investment it doesn’t yet know what. The partnership is represented on a new group set up to keep abreast of news on Post 2006 convergence through the whole of the South West of England. That group is also deciding a communications strategy.
In taking forward the economic agenda the partnership is determined to maintain the territorial visibility of Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly as an area with a positive appetite for regeneration and change and will continue to dream up new ways to get the message across.
7.21.2006
Rough road through the way of public procurement after the EU accession
Rough road through the way of public procurement after the EU accession
László Velikovszky
Head of Unit
Hungarian Development Office – Unit for Procurement Coordination and Control
Deák F. u. 5.
1052 Budapest
Hungary
Phone: +36-30-2227428
Email: velikovszky.laszlo@cfcu.gov.hu
Web: www.cfcu.hu/ekke
The new Hungarian Act on Public Procurement entered into force on 1 May 2004, on the day of Hungary’s EU accession. But it’s important to emphasize that those parts of the new Act which regulate contract award procedures for public procurement with support from European Union structural funds and Cohesion Fund entered into force on 1 January 2004. The main purpose of the Act was to ensure the total harmonization of the Hungarian regulation to the Community Law. This purpose has come to fruition.
Furthermore the purpose was to provide for transparency and extensive public control in the reasonable use of public monies, ensure the fairness of public competition in the course of public procurement in accordance with our applicable international agreements and European Community legislation and hereby promote the reduction of risks of corruption. The principles of fairness and public nature of competition also predominate in the course of Hungarian contract award procedures. In the remedy proceedings regulated by the Act the application may be submitted only on an infringement of principles.
The Hungarian regulation of public procurement also wanted to assure the transparency of use of public monies through determination of thresholds of the public procurement. Although the Community directives on public procurement deal only with the public contracts of a value reaching or exceeding the Community thresholds, the Member States of the EU had the possibility to establish their national thresholds. Hungary has exploit this opportunity. Therefore our Act has determined three kinds of regimes on thresholds and procedures: public procurements reaching or exceeding Community thresholds, public procurements of a value reaching or exceeding the national thresholds but not reaching the Community thresholds and finally public procurements below the national value thresholds.
The Hungarian Act on Public Procurement determines the contracting authorities extensively: with respect to the contracting authorities the Act distinguishes two larger groups: one of them is called the classical contracting authorities and the other one is called the special contracting authorities. The fist group involves for example ministries, central budgetary authorities, public bodies, public foundations, those entities whose subsidy is granted by the State or the EU by more than 50 %. The second group involves entities operating in the water, energy, transportation and electronic telecommunication sectors. The system of the remedies in relation to public procurement also harmonizes with the Community Law. This system regulated by the Act ensures immediate and efficient remedies after the occurrence of the infringements. It imposes sanctions against breaking and evading the Act.
László Velikovszky
Head of Unit
Hungarian Development Office – Unit for Procurement Coordination and Control
Deák F. u. 5.
1052 Budapest
Hungary
Phone: +36-30-2227428
Email: velikovszky.laszlo@cfcu.gov.hu
Web: www.cfcu.hu/ekke
The new Hungarian Act on Public Procurement entered into force on 1 May 2004, on the day of Hungary’s EU accession. But it’s important to emphasize that those parts of the new Act which regulate contract award procedures for public procurement with support from European Union structural funds and Cohesion Fund entered into force on 1 January 2004. The main purpose of the Act was to ensure the total harmonization of the Hungarian regulation to the Community Law. This purpose has come to fruition.
Furthermore the purpose was to provide for transparency and extensive public control in the reasonable use of public monies, ensure the fairness of public competition in the course of public procurement in accordance with our applicable international agreements and European Community legislation and hereby promote the reduction of risks of corruption. The principles of fairness and public nature of competition also predominate in the course of Hungarian contract award procedures. In the remedy proceedings regulated by the Act the application may be submitted only on an infringement of principles.
The Hungarian regulation of public procurement also wanted to assure the transparency of use of public monies through determination of thresholds of the public procurement. Although the Community directives on public procurement deal only with the public contracts of a value reaching or exceeding the Community thresholds, the Member States of the EU had the possibility to establish their national thresholds. Hungary has exploit this opportunity. Therefore our Act has determined three kinds of regimes on thresholds and procedures: public procurements reaching or exceeding Community thresholds, public procurements of a value reaching or exceeding the national thresholds but not reaching the Community thresholds and finally public procurements below the national value thresholds.
The Hungarian Act on Public Procurement determines the contracting authorities extensively: with respect to the contracting authorities the Act distinguishes two larger groups: one of them is called the classical contracting authorities and the other one is called the special contracting authorities. The fist group involves for example ministries, central budgetary authorities, public bodies, public foundations, those entities whose subsidy is granted by the State or the EU by more than 50 %. The second group involves entities operating in the water, energy, transportation and electronic telecommunication sectors. The system of the remedies in relation to public procurement also harmonizes with the Community Law. This system regulated by the Act ensures immediate and efficient remedies after the occurrence of the infringements. It imposes sanctions against breaking and evading the Act.
Countries might converge, unlike provinces
Albert van der Horst
Researcher
CPB, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
Van Stolkweg 14
2585 JR The Hague
The Netherlands
Phone: +31 703383402
Email: vanderhorst@cpb.nl
Web: www.cpb.nl/nl/general/org/homepages/avdh/
Countries might converge, unlike provinces
The European Union is one of the most prosperous parts of the world. Yet there are large regional disparities in productivity, wages, and employment, and they have only increased with the recent enlargement. Thus, there seems to be ample justification for helping lagging regions to catch up, both at the national and the European level. Unfortunately, regional policy appears to be ineffective. Well known are the fruitless attempts of Italy to bridge the gap between the Mezzogiorno and the North, of Germany to bridge the gap between the Neue Länder and the West, and of the European Commission to reduce regional disparities in general.
This study validates one explanation of the ineffectiveness of regional policy. We set off from the New Economic Geography (NEG), a relatively new branch of economics that incorporates agglomeration advantages and location choice in a formal general equilibrium framework. By estimating the key parameters of NEG models with European regional data, we are able to underpin the conclusion that dogged attempts to make lagging regions catch up are often doomed to fail. Lagging regions do not stand alone, but pertain to local core-periphery systems. Economic activity lured to the periphery by subsidies will in the long run end up
in the core. This is because the periphery lacks the critical economic mass.
Regional policy demands a theory that explains the location of production and consumption. Since the early nineties economists have such a theory at their disposal: the NEG unites within a consistent general equilibrium framework older insights from international trade theory and spatial economics.
Firms and workers are subject to centripetal and centrifugal market forces. The owner of a firm must choose a location for his plant. If he chooses a core region, i.e. a region with a large market, then he saves on trade costs. Less goods will have to `exported' to other regions. Therefore, he can set a lower price, and thus capture a larger share of the market. If he chooses a peripheral region, i.e. a region with a small market, then he faces less competition from other local firms. Moreover, he evades urban costs such as congestion and high land prices. Similarly, a worker must choose a location where to live and work. If he chooses a core region, then he gets a higher real wage. If he chooses a peripheral region, he evades urban costs.
The list of centripetal and centrifugal forces working on firms and workers can be extended, and differs between NEG models. The common denominator of the models is, however, that location decisions depend on the balance of these forces, which in their turn depend on trade costs. A range of trade costs supports an even distribution of economic activity. We call this state the `dispersion equilibrium'. A complementary range supports an uneven distribution of economic activity, in which one region hosts a disproportionate amount. We call this state the `agglomeration equilibrium'.
The agglomeration equilibrium is characterised by a spatial wage structure: agglomeration advantages materialise as higher wages in core regions. Moreover, the causality of location choice underlying the equilibrium is circular: firms and workers prefer the core since it has the largest market; the core has the largest market since it host many firms and workers. Thus, if agglomeration equilibria are the rule, regional disparities are difficult to counter with regional policy.
What does the European economic geography look like? A satellite picture of Europe reveals banana shaped beam of light running from London to Milan that indicates a large cluster of economic activity. Zooming in reveals, moreover, that similar core-periphery structures repeat themselves at lower levels of aggregation. Agglomeration is ubiquitous.
Descriptive statistics confirm the eyeball analysis of the satellite picture. It indicates that
agglomeration is especially pronounced at a (sub) provincial level of regional aggregation. Moreover, the little movement in the location of economic activity that can be discerned is attributable to the increasing importance of services as compared to agriculture and manufacturing. Agglomeration is local and stable.
The observation that agglomeration is global is confirmed by the econometric analysis of the spatial wage structure in European regions. We show that wages are relatively high, not only in, but also in the neighbourhood of agglomerated regions. The estimates imply a strong agglomeration advantage that quickly peters out over distance.
It is unsurprising that regional policy often fails to reduce regional disparities in productivity and income. Core regions tend to be better off than their surrounding peripheries. And core-periphery structures are hard to upset since agglomeration advantages pull economic activity to the cores.
In this light the recent shift in thinking on regional policy makes sense. Policy makers seem more willing to recognise that disparities between provinces, and between regions within provinces are persistent. They increasingly target the available funds on regional growth poles.
There is, however, an equity-efficiency trade off. Agglomeration is positively related to overall productivity and growth, but negatively to wage equality. Moreover, improving the market access of peripheral regions with infrastructure - or any other initiative that promotes economic integration - may in fact increase regional disparities. It increases the incentive to locate in the core once the peripheral market can be supplied from here with
more ease. If one is to improve the fate of lagging regions, then a focus on large regions that contain their own core periphery structures, as well as a focus on labour - the least mobile production factor - is desirable.
Researcher
CPB, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
Van Stolkweg 14
2585 JR The Hague
The Netherlands
Phone: +31 703383402
Email: vanderhorst@cpb.nl
Web: www.cpb.nl/nl/general/org/homepages/avdh/
Countries might converge, unlike provinces
The European Union is one of the most prosperous parts of the world. Yet there are large regional disparities in productivity, wages, and employment, and they have only increased with the recent enlargement. Thus, there seems to be ample justification for helping lagging regions to catch up, both at the national and the European level. Unfortunately, regional policy appears to be ineffective. Well known are the fruitless attempts of Italy to bridge the gap between the Mezzogiorno and the North, of Germany to bridge the gap between the Neue Länder and the West, and of the European Commission to reduce regional disparities in general.
This study validates one explanation of the ineffectiveness of regional policy. We set off from the New Economic Geography (NEG), a relatively new branch of economics that incorporates agglomeration advantages and location choice in a formal general equilibrium framework. By estimating the key parameters of NEG models with European regional data, we are able to underpin the conclusion that dogged attempts to make lagging regions catch up are often doomed to fail. Lagging regions do not stand alone, but pertain to local core-periphery systems. Economic activity lured to the periphery by subsidies will in the long run end up
in the core. This is because the periphery lacks the critical economic mass.
Regional policy demands a theory that explains the location of production and consumption. Since the early nineties economists have such a theory at their disposal: the NEG unites within a consistent general equilibrium framework older insights from international trade theory and spatial economics.
Firms and workers are subject to centripetal and centrifugal market forces. The owner of a firm must choose a location for his plant. If he chooses a core region, i.e. a region with a large market, then he saves on trade costs. Less goods will have to `exported' to other regions. Therefore, he can set a lower price, and thus capture a larger share of the market. If he chooses a peripheral region, i.e. a region with a small market, then he faces less competition from other local firms. Moreover, he evades urban costs such as congestion and high land prices. Similarly, a worker must choose a location where to live and work. If he chooses a core region, then he gets a higher real wage. If he chooses a peripheral region, he evades urban costs.
The list of centripetal and centrifugal forces working on firms and workers can be extended, and differs between NEG models. The common denominator of the models is, however, that location decisions depend on the balance of these forces, which in their turn depend on trade costs. A range of trade costs supports an even distribution of economic activity. We call this state the `dispersion equilibrium'. A complementary range supports an uneven distribution of economic activity, in which one region hosts a disproportionate amount. We call this state the `agglomeration equilibrium'.
The agglomeration equilibrium is characterised by a spatial wage structure: agglomeration advantages materialise as higher wages in core regions. Moreover, the causality of location choice underlying the equilibrium is circular: firms and workers prefer the core since it has the largest market; the core has the largest market since it host many firms and workers. Thus, if agglomeration equilibria are the rule, regional disparities are difficult to counter with regional policy.
What does the European economic geography look like? A satellite picture of Europe reveals banana shaped beam of light running from London to Milan that indicates a large cluster of economic activity. Zooming in reveals, moreover, that similar core-periphery structures repeat themselves at lower levels of aggregation. Agglomeration is ubiquitous.
Descriptive statistics confirm the eyeball analysis of the satellite picture. It indicates that
agglomeration is especially pronounced at a (sub) provincial level of regional aggregation. Moreover, the little movement in the location of economic activity that can be discerned is attributable to the increasing importance of services as compared to agriculture and manufacturing. Agglomeration is local and stable.
The observation that agglomeration is global is confirmed by the econometric analysis of the spatial wage structure in European regions. We show that wages are relatively high, not only in, but also in the neighbourhood of agglomerated regions. The estimates imply a strong agglomeration advantage that quickly peters out over distance.
It is unsurprising that regional policy often fails to reduce regional disparities in productivity and income. Core regions tend to be better off than their surrounding peripheries. And core-periphery structures are hard to upset since agglomeration advantages pull economic activity to the cores.
In this light the recent shift in thinking on regional policy makes sense. Policy makers seem more willing to recognise that disparities between provinces, and between regions within provinces are persistent. They increasingly target the available funds on regional growth poles.
There is, however, an equity-efficiency trade off. Agglomeration is positively related to overall productivity and growth, but negatively to wage equality. Moreover, improving the market access of peripheral regions with infrastructure - or any other initiative that promotes economic integration - may in fact increase regional disparities. It increases the incentive to locate in the core once the peripheral market can be supplied from here with
more ease. If one is to improve the fate of lagging regions, then a focus on large regions that contain their own core periphery structures, as well as a focus on labour - the least mobile production factor - is desirable.
The Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme
By Johannes Flensted-Jensen, County Mayor of Aarhus and Chairman of the Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme
e-mail: jfj@ag.aaa.dk www.aaa.dk and www.jylland-fyn.dk
The Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme
The Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme was set up in 1998 by the 8 counties and 173 municipalities in the region, along with the Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs. Just over 50% of the Danish population live within the Jutland–Fyn region.
Long before 1998, these Danish counties and municipalities had observed that Greater Copenhagen was developing at a much faster rate than their own region. They also noticed that this rate of development was intensifying over time. A significant reason for this was that state funds were being spent to a greater degree in Greater Copenhagen than in the rest of Denmark. Until 1998, the individual counties and municipalities competed for investments from both the state and private sectors. This meant that it became much too easy for the state to play the local and regional authorities off against each other. Something had to be done to alter this state of affairs.
That “something” was the Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme, headed by a political steering group with very good decision-making powers. This group consisted of the 8 county mayors and 8 mayors representing all the municipalities in each of the individual counties. The Danish state was also represented.
The venture was set up after realising that wide-reaching cooperation was necessary right across the board, cutting through administrative boundaries and both the public and private sectors – to ensure good conditions as a basic framework for the business community throughout the region.
The first task for this venture was to analyse precisely where any imbalance occurred. The results confirmed the feeling that most people already had – namely that, compared with Greater Copenhagen, the Jutland–Fyn region had a considerably lower level of education and training; a higher rate of unemployment; lower income levels and basis of taxation; lower incidence of setting up new companies; less use of IT in business; and considerably less expenditure on research and innovation.
With this information in hand, it was much easier to reach agreement on what the problem was and which issues should be focused on as part of the business cooperation scheme.
The venture currently has four main focus areas that should also be considered in the light of increasing globalisation:
· Education, training and expertise
· Entrepreneurship
· Innovation and research
· IT
The Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme has led to a number of projects that have provided additional benefits in terms of the emergence of a network culture that transcends the normal boundaries between the business community, the education and research institutions and the public authorities. This has provided a solid, forward-looking basis for collaboration focusing on growth and innovation in the Danish business community – and it is this environment that provides the foundation for the comprehensive activities that are constantly being developed as part of this business cooperation scheme.
The venture also aims to exert an influence on the overall regional-political agenda in Denmark. One measure currently under way is a conference to be held in Copenhagen on 7 October 2005 to help persuade the Danish parliament to decide on greater decentralisation of state jobs.
What has the venture achieved in these focus areas?
IT
The Jutland–Fyn IT effort really took off in 2002, when a broad political agreement was reached in the Danish parliament regarding the allocation of DKK 175 million to the Jutland–Fyn region over a period of 4 years. This sum was doubled by an allocation from members of the Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme and the business community. Our focus on IT will strengthen the key IT skills and widen the use of IT in the entire Jutland–Fyn region – especially in those areas that are not located close to the IT knowledge centres. The IT effort is built up via close collaboration between the knowledge and education institutions and the business community. The aim is to create synergy between the business community and the world of research as regards knowledge about IT. Half of the funds have been allocated to 4 specialist IT centres in the Jutland–Fyn region. The other half have been used for specific collaborative projects between the knowledge centres and the business community. So far, this has involved more than 80 projects, ranging from IT in toys to digital scenography and computer models of building components. Two knowledge-sharing conferences have also been held.
Innovation and research
Expenditure on innovation and research has also been sharply increased in both the private and public sectors. However, cooperation between private companies and public research institutions is lagging behind. The Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme has therefore financed and set up a scheme called “Research Contact”, which draws on DKK 28 million (EUR 4 million) to provide subsidies to collaborative projects between knowledge institutions and private companies in the Jutland–Fyn region. In addition, the venture has initiated several projects aimed at enabling students to gain practical experience in private companies, especially those located outside the major urban areas. The aim of this is twofold – partly to get the students to see the job opportunities that exist in smaller private companies, and partly to provide these companies with the latest research knowledge.
Within this area, the Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme also held a camp that focused on commercialising a larger proportion of the inventions and research results that stem from the public health sector.
Education, training and expertise
Education and training are mainly financed by the state in Denmark, and the venture’s opportunities therefore mostly consist of exerting an influence on the national decision-makers to increase education and training efforts and to make it easier to get credit for skills already acquired. We are by no means passive. We held a camp attended by all the most important education and training representatives to obtain as many ideas as possible for raising the level of education and training in the region. This resulted in a suggestion for building up business courses based on modules to make further education and training more flexible. Members of the Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme were willing to jointly finance such a proposal for state courses, but the Danish state has so far refused to contribute to implementing the suggestion.
Another project that arose at the camp is “Developing skills at the workplace”, which enables employees to improve their skills during working hours.
Entrepreneurship
All the counties and municipalities in Denmark try to provide consultancy services to increase the rate of entrepreneurship and improve the ability of entrepreneurs to survive. The Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme held a camp to boost entrepreneurship in the region. This led to the building of a Jutland–Fyn entrepreneur high school, which is currently under construction. This school will provide tuition for both entrepreneurs and their families in what it actually means to be an entrepreneur and an entrepreneur family. The school is financed by the Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme, participating counties and the European Social Fund (ESF).
The Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme in an EU perspective
Collaborating with other regions in Europe has not been part of the agenda to date – in terms of the EU. This is not because we are reluctant to cooperate, but because the venture has concentrated up to now on managing to set up interdisciplinary partnership across administrative boundaries in West Denmark. However, cooperating with other European regions is one of our aims. Based on the preliminary statements regarding the new programme period, the Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme can see opportunities for entering into new partnerships with other regions in Europe.
Individual members of the Jutland–Fyn partnership have independently participated in a number of EU-related activities and programmes, such as political-administrative collaborative projects in CPMR (Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe), including the North Sea Commission. Other projects include the EU Commission’s network of Innovating Regions in Europe (IRE), as well as research projects and regional development projects.
In the new programme period for 2007, we see far more opportunities for entering into partnerships with other regions in Europe. This could include regional development with a focus on research and innovation, business development, tourism and rural districts. We see significant advantages in being part of the solid Innovating Regions in Europe (IRE) network.
I can also see opportunities for Jutland–Fyn participating in
· Entrepreneurs: Seeking financing through business matching
· InvestorNet: Investors
· Technology Incubator Managers: Incubator forum for technology and management
· Academia Network: Academia in entrepreneurship, innovation and finance
· Service Centre: Innovative companies seeking expert service providers
· ProTon Europe: Transferring knowledge between research centres and companies, institutions, etc., including the setting up of Knowledge Transfer Offices between education and training at a high level of knowledge.
This opens up considerable opportunities for developing cooperation and regional partnership within the region between knowledge centres, companies and public institutions, as well as expanding geographically to include European regions and European collaboration with the EU.
e-mail: jfj@ag.aaa.dk www.aaa.dk and www.jylland-fyn.dk
The Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme
The Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme was set up in 1998 by the 8 counties and 173 municipalities in the region, along with the Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs. Just over 50% of the Danish population live within the Jutland–Fyn region.
Long before 1998, these Danish counties and municipalities had observed that Greater Copenhagen was developing at a much faster rate than their own region. They also noticed that this rate of development was intensifying over time. A significant reason for this was that state funds were being spent to a greater degree in Greater Copenhagen than in the rest of Denmark. Until 1998, the individual counties and municipalities competed for investments from both the state and private sectors. This meant that it became much too easy for the state to play the local and regional authorities off against each other. Something had to be done to alter this state of affairs.
That “something” was the Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme, headed by a political steering group with very good decision-making powers. This group consisted of the 8 county mayors and 8 mayors representing all the municipalities in each of the individual counties. The Danish state was also represented.
The venture was set up after realising that wide-reaching cooperation was necessary right across the board, cutting through administrative boundaries and both the public and private sectors – to ensure good conditions as a basic framework for the business community throughout the region.
The first task for this venture was to analyse precisely where any imbalance occurred. The results confirmed the feeling that most people already had – namely that, compared with Greater Copenhagen, the Jutland–Fyn region had a considerably lower level of education and training; a higher rate of unemployment; lower income levels and basis of taxation; lower incidence of setting up new companies; less use of IT in business; and considerably less expenditure on research and innovation.
With this information in hand, it was much easier to reach agreement on what the problem was and which issues should be focused on as part of the business cooperation scheme.
The venture currently has four main focus areas that should also be considered in the light of increasing globalisation:
· Education, training and expertise
· Entrepreneurship
· Innovation and research
· IT
The Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme has led to a number of projects that have provided additional benefits in terms of the emergence of a network culture that transcends the normal boundaries between the business community, the education and research institutions and the public authorities. This has provided a solid, forward-looking basis for collaboration focusing on growth and innovation in the Danish business community – and it is this environment that provides the foundation for the comprehensive activities that are constantly being developed as part of this business cooperation scheme.
The venture also aims to exert an influence on the overall regional-political agenda in Denmark. One measure currently under way is a conference to be held in Copenhagen on 7 October 2005 to help persuade the Danish parliament to decide on greater decentralisation of state jobs.
What has the venture achieved in these focus areas?
IT
The Jutland–Fyn IT effort really took off in 2002, when a broad political agreement was reached in the Danish parliament regarding the allocation of DKK 175 million to the Jutland–Fyn region over a period of 4 years. This sum was doubled by an allocation from members of the Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme and the business community. Our focus on IT will strengthen the key IT skills and widen the use of IT in the entire Jutland–Fyn region – especially in those areas that are not located close to the IT knowledge centres. The IT effort is built up via close collaboration between the knowledge and education institutions and the business community. The aim is to create synergy between the business community and the world of research as regards knowledge about IT. Half of the funds have been allocated to 4 specialist IT centres in the Jutland–Fyn region. The other half have been used for specific collaborative projects between the knowledge centres and the business community. So far, this has involved more than 80 projects, ranging from IT in toys to digital scenography and computer models of building components. Two knowledge-sharing conferences have also been held.
Innovation and research
Expenditure on innovation and research has also been sharply increased in both the private and public sectors. However, cooperation between private companies and public research institutions is lagging behind. The Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme has therefore financed and set up a scheme called “Research Contact”, which draws on DKK 28 million (EUR 4 million) to provide subsidies to collaborative projects between knowledge institutions and private companies in the Jutland–Fyn region. In addition, the venture has initiated several projects aimed at enabling students to gain practical experience in private companies, especially those located outside the major urban areas. The aim of this is twofold – partly to get the students to see the job opportunities that exist in smaller private companies, and partly to provide these companies with the latest research knowledge.
Within this area, the Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme also held a camp that focused on commercialising a larger proportion of the inventions and research results that stem from the public health sector.
Education, training and expertise
Education and training are mainly financed by the state in Denmark, and the venture’s opportunities therefore mostly consist of exerting an influence on the national decision-makers to increase education and training efforts and to make it easier to get credit for skills already acquired. We are by no means passive. We held a camp attended by all the most important education and training representatives to obtain as many ideas as possible for raising the level of education and training in the region. This resulted in a suggestion for building up business courses based on modules to make further education and training more flexible. Members of the Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme were willing to jointly finance such a proposal for state courses, but the Danish state has so far refused to contribute to implementing the suggestion.
Another project that arose at the camp is “Developing skills at the workplace”, which enables employees to improve their skills during working hours.
Entrepreneurship
All the counties and municipalities in Denmark try to provide consultancy services to increase the rate of entrepreneurship and improve the ability of entrepreneurs to survive. The Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme held a camp to boost entrepreneurship in the region. This led to the building of a Jutland–Fyn entrepreneur high school, which is currently under construction. This school will provide tuition for both entrepreneurs and their families in what it actually means to be an entrepreneur and an entrepreneur family. The school is financed by the Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme, participating counties and the European Social Fund (ESF).
The Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme in an EU perspective
Collaborating with other regions in Europe has not been part of the agenda to date – in terms of the EU. This is not because we are reluctant to cooperate, but because the venture has concentrated up to now on managing to set up interdisciplinary partnership across administrative boundaries in West Denmark. However, cooperating with other European regions is one of our aims. Based on the preliminary statements regarding the new programme period, the Jutland–Fyn Business Cooperation Scheme can see opportunities for entering into new partnerships with other regions in Europe.
Individual members of the Jutland–Fyn partnership have independently participated in a number of EU-related activities and programmes, such as political-administrative collaborative projects in CPMR (Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe), including the North Sea Commission. Other projects include the EU Commission’s network of Innovating Regions in Europe (IRE), as well as research projects and regional development projects.
In the new programme period for 2007, we see far more opportunities for entering into partnerships with other regions in Europe. This could include regional development with a focus on research and innovation, business development, tourism and rural districts. We see significant advantages in being part of the solid Innovating Regions in Europe (IRE) network.
I can also see opportunities for Jutland–Fyn participating in
· Entrepreneurs: Seeking financing through business matching
· InvestorNet: Investors
· Technology Incubator Managers: Incubator forum for technology and management
· Academia Network: Academia in entrepreneurship, innovation and finance
· Service Centre: Innovative companies seeking expert service providers
· ProTon Europe: Transferring knowledge between research centres and companies, institutions, etc., including the setting up of Knowledge Transfer Offices between education and training at a high level of knowledge.
This opens up considerable opportunities for developing cooperation and regional partnership within the region between knowledge centres, companies and public institutions, as well as expanding geographically to include European regions and European collaboration with the EU.
Planning regional development of „lagging regions“- example from Slovakia
Planning regional development of „lagging regions“-
example from Slovakia
Andrej Steiner, PhD.
Carpathian Development Institute, Slovak Republic
steiner@kri.sk; www.kri.sk
It is generally acknowledged that there has been a steady trend towards an increase in spatial and regional disparities within the EU. The European Commission has long recognized that the process of economic integration championed by the EC through the construction of the Single European market and the EMU could and does sharpen regional inequalities in the EU. This could ultimately undermine the cohesion of the EU and the political viability of (and support for) the project of European economic and political integration.
An active EU policy to address above-mentioned challenges has been reflected mainly in creation of the “European Regional Development Fund” to assist the development of the lagging or declining regions of the European Community. However, it has often been highlighted that there are strong tensions and incompatibilities between the objectives of economic competitiveness through economic integration and liberalisation on the one hand and 'economic and social cohesion' on the other.
Currently Slovakia, as one of the EU newcomers, is taken by EC as the region lagging deeply behind of the EU GDP average. The Slovak government has based so far its development policy on the National Development Plan and central management of EU funds. The Slovak economy as whole (NUTS I level) is at present improving (mainly in macro-economic indicators) but the economies (and quality of life) of its four NUTS II regions differ a lot. The greatest difference (in negative sense) one can find between the Slovakia–East region (Kosice and Presov self-governing NUTS III regions) and Slovakia as such. This gap in growth rates is damaging and could even more damage the national economy, as it means that these regions are not fulfilling their potential. It also results in reduced life chances for people in the poorer regions where not only low productivity but also unemployment and ill health are concentrated.
The Government has not so far acknowledge fully the scale and persistence of this gap and we are concerned that not enough has yet been done to ensure that policies and funds distribution are in place to allow to reduce the intra-national development gaps.
We are confident the Government needs to take tough decision about priorities including:
Recognising the differences between regions and prioritising the least prosperous ones, rather than current approach of developing policies for the benefit of all regions.
Acknowledging that measures needed to tackle unemployment need to be different in areas where are a lots of jobs and in place where job opportunities are few and far between
Ensuring that the fundamentals for growth – infrastructure, research and development investment are put in place now in less prosperous regions
Giving adequate power and resources to elected regional assemblies
Reviewing and revising the allocation of public resources between regions of Slovakia
Furthermore the major indicator for the measurement of performance – regional Gross Domestic Product per head, does not represent the real situation in the region and we recommend instead the use of basket of measures including productivity, employment and unemployment rates, household income, span of GDP in different districts within the region, quality of life etc.
Various EU countries have started to pay attention to decentralized development management, which creates a favorable environment for local/regional economic development planning. However, a number of basic problems in Slovakia hinder the effective functioning of such a system. One of the most important obstacles constitutes a general lack of reliable planning relevant information at that level. The shortcomings especially pertain to the peripheral regions. This observation implies that particularly in those contexts where a planning decision support basis is needed most urgently, data and information on the availability and use of resources and the potentials and constraints for local/regional economic development are highly deficient. Especially socio-economic profile data, including baseline figures, dynamics and trends, are either unavailable, or invalid/outdated. Moreover, planning relevant information on spatial aspects, such as socio-economic distribution patterns and their dynamics, is largely absent. Ensuing, a framework for public action in the three principal development policy areas of promoting opportunity, facilitating empowerment and enhancing human resources, respectively, is difficult to construct. It is vital, particularly in remote peripheral regions, to build capacity for regional participatory planning and management decision support bases by gaining insight in the availability and use of indigenous resources, and to assess the regional potentials and constraints concerning sustainable regional development within the context of national and EU development philosophy.
The underlying assumption is often that the problems of ‘lagging regions’ can be solved by copying more successful regions, which is not always the case. A more nuanced approach, tailored to individual regions, is strongly recommended. For example, in relation to rural and peripheral regions, a critical factor for successful regional development tends to be the need for branches of local/regional state and self-governing governments to work together, also so they can better attract investments and support the regional private sector. Such areas do not always have the opportunity or resources to develop strong PPPs or establish local industrial clusters. Networking, both within and external to the region should, however, be a key component of all regions’ knowledge economy development strategies. Introducing the new regional policy model i.e. shifting from regional government to regional governance (from public sector as direct deliverer of services and policy maker to just one player and at best the strategic enabler), apart from the democratic assets in this approach, is often appropriate in peripheral regions. There is also a tendency, at both national and sometimes European level, to underplay the role of the regional authorities and their responsibility for development of the area under their jurisdiction. Indeed, the role of regional government is vitally important and does not seem to be being squeezed to insignificance between the jaws of a new global dichotomy as some would have it.
Regional policies and regional development programs in peripheral lagging regions should be appropriate to practical needs. For example, the importance of business concentration highlights policy interventions that focus on improving regional/local factor conditions as a means of enhancing competitive advantage. Most of those factor conditions depend often on regional or proximate markets for factor inputs such as local demand and supply, industrial and other interdependencies, accessibility and the governance structure.
Policy initiatives can play an important role in improving these conditions. At a regional level, major efforts can be devoted to improving tailored education, training, public research and infrastructure. Exchange of information can be stimulated and common approaches can be developed to improve synergies between businesses, and between public and private agents. Barriers to market entry or growth can be reduced, particularly for small firms, by improving access to ‘business supports’, for example through provision of information, advice and improved access to venture capital.
As it was already mentioned, the self-governing regions of Košice and Prešov belong among the least developed territories in the Slovak Republic and among ten least developed regions of the European Union. This is a consequence of the difficult transformation process in the region, insufficiently developed transport, technological, and civic infrastructure, but also influence of the peripheral position of the region within Slovakia (not merely from the geographical distance viewpoint but also from partially organizational and institutional separation).
Today’s approach of the Slovak central government in setting up development priorities and mechanism for decision-making process of EU financial assistance distribution has only marginally contributed towards reducing intra-national regional disparities. The process of development of the genuine Regional Development Plan (RDP) for the Slovakia East - NUTS II region (consisting of two administratively independent NUTS III regions) has been initiated by regional authorities in 2004 and should lead to
- reinforcement of the Slovakia-East regional priorities in the National Strategic Reference Framework - based on deep knowledge of regional/local needs and potential
- empowerment of regional structures enabling their active role in decision-making process
- more responsibility in the sphere of EU funds management to the region
We believe that the most important components in the development and maintenance of planning system – shared values and integrated approach are stronger developed at the regional/local level, so the planning process for the given disadvantaged region, including partial or full implementation, should stay there. It is obvious that appropriate managerial mechanism/system, capacity and skills, public support and interconnectedness with national plans should be in place.
Less centralized approach will be a significant key to regional growth, with less bureaucracy, more coherent regional policy, and better quality of programmes and projects, as well as it will win stronger public support.
example from Slovakia
Andrej Steiner, PhD.
Carpathian Development Institute, Slovak Republic
steiner@kri.sk; www.kri.sk
It is generally acknowledged that there has been a steady trend towards an increase in spatial and regional disparities within the EU. The European Commission has long recognized that the process of economic integration championed by the EC through the construction of the Single European market and the EMU could and does sharpen regional inequalities in the EU. This could ultimately undermine the cohesion of the EU and the political viability of (and support for) the project of European economic and political integration.
An active EU policy to address above-mentioned challenges has been reflected mainly in creation of the “European Regional Development Fund” to assist the development of the lagging or declining regions of the European Community. However, it has often been highlighted that there are strong tensions and incompatibilities between the objectives of economic competitiveness through economic integration and liberalisation on the one hand and 'economic and social cohesion' on the other.
Currently Slovakia, as one of the EU newcomers, is taken by EC as the region lagging deeply behind of the EU GDP average. The Slovak government has based so far its development policy on the National Development Plan and central management of EU funds. The Slovak economy as whole (NUTS I level) is at present improving (mainly in macro-economic indicators) but the economies (and quality of life) of its four NUTS II regions differ a lot. The greatest difference (in negative sense) one can find between the Slovakia–East region (Kosice and Presov self-governing NUTS III regions) and Slovakia as such. This gap in growth rates is damaging and could even more damage the national economy, as it means that these regions are not fulfilling their potential. It also results in reduced life chances for people in the poorer regions where not only low productivity but also unemployment and ill health are concentrated.
The Government has not so far acknowledge fully the scale and persistence of this gap and we are concerned that not enough has yet been done to ensure that policies and funds distribution are in place to allow to reduce the intra-national development gaps.
We are confident the Government needs to take tough decision about priorities including:
Recognising the differences between regions and prioritising the least prosperous ones, rather than current approach of developing policies for the benefit of all regions.
Acknowledging that measures needed to tackle unemployment need to be different in areas where are a lots of jobs and in place where job opportunities are few and far between
Ensuring that the fundamentals for growth – infrastructure, research and development investment are put in place now in less prosperous regions
Giving adequate power and resources to elected regional assemblies
Reviewing and revising the allocation of public resources between regions of Slovakia
Furthermore the major indicator for the measurement of performance – regional Gross Domestic Product per head, does not represent the real situation in the region and we recommend instead the use of basket of measures including productivity, employment and unemployment rates, household income, span of GDP in different districts within the region, quality of life etc.
Various EU countries have started to pay attention to decentralized development management, which creates a favorable environment for local/regional economic development planning. However, a number of basic problems in Slovakia hinder the effective functioning of such a system. One of the most important obstacles constitutes a general lack of reliable planning relevant information at that level. The shortcomings especially pertain to the peripheral regions. This observation implies that particularly in those contexts where a planning decision support basis is needed most urgently, data and information on the availability and use of resources and the potentials and constraints for local/regional economic development are highly deficient. Especially socio-economic profile data, including baseline figures, dynamics and trends, are either unavailable, or invalid/outdated. Moreover, planning relevant information on spatial aspects, such as socio-economic distribution patterns and their dynamics, is largely absent. Ensuing, a framework for public action in the three principal development policy areas of promoting opportunity, facilitating empowerment and enhancing human resources, respectively, is difficult to construct. It is vital, particularly in remote peripheral regions, to build capacity for regional participatory planning and management decision support bases by gaining insight in the availability and use of indigenous resources, and to assess the regional potentials and constraints concerning sustainable regional development within the context of national and EU development philosophy.
The underlying assumption is often that the problems of ‘lagging regions’ can be solved by copying more successful regions, which is not always the case. A more nuanced approach, tailored to individual regions, is strongly recommended. For example, in relation to rural and peripheral regions, a critical factor for successful regional development tends to be the need for branches of local/regional state and self-governing governments to work together, also so they can better attract investments and support the regional private sector. Such areas do not always have the opportunity or resources to develop strong PPPs or establish local industrial clusters. Networking, both within and external to the region should, however, be a key component of all regions’ knowledge economy development strategies. Introducing the new regional policy model i.e. shifting from regional government to regional governance (from public sector as direct deliverer of services and policy maker to just one player and at best the strategic enabler), apart from the democratic assets in this approach, is often appropriate in peripheral regions. There is also a tendency, at both national and sometimes European level, to underplay the role of the regional authorities and their responsibility for development of the area under their jurisdiction. Indeed, the role of regional government is vitally important and does not seem to be being squeezed to insignificance between the jaws of a new global dichotomy as some would have it.
Regional policies and regional development programs in peripheral lagging regions should be appropriate to practical needs. For example, the importance of business concentration highlights policy interventions that focus on improving regional/local factor conditions as a means of enhancing competitive advantage. Most of those factor conditions depend often on regional or proximate markets for factor inputs such as local demand and supply, industrial and other interdependencies, accessibility and the governance structure.
Policy initiatives can play an important role in improving these conditions. At a regional level, major efforts can be devoted to improving tailored education, training, public research and infrastructure. Exchange of information can be stimulated and common approaches can be developed to improve synergies between businesses, and between public and private agents. Barriers to market entry or growth can be reduced, particularly for small firms, by improving access to ‘business supports’, for example through provision of information, advice and improved access to venture capital.
As it was already mentioned, the self-governing regions of Košice and Prešov belong among the least developed territories in the Slovak Republic and among ten least developed regions of the European Union. This is a consequence of the difficult transformation process in the region, insufficiently developed transport, technological, and civic infrastructure, but also influence of the peripheral position of the region within Slovakia (not merely from the geographical distance viewpoint but also from partially organizational and institutional separation).
Today’s approach of the Slovak central government in setting up development priorities and mechanism for decision-making process of EU financial assistance distribution has only marginally contributed towards reducing intra-national regional disparities. The process of development of the genuine Regional Development Plan (RDP) for the Slovakia East - NUTS II region (consisting of two administratively independent NUTS III regions) has been initiated by regional authorities in 2004 and should lead to
- reinforcement of the Slovakia-East regional priorities in the National Strategic Reference Framework - based on deep knowledge of regional/local needs and potential
- empowerment of regional structures enabling their active role in decision-making process
- more responsibility in the sphere of EU funds management to the region
We believe that the most important components in the development and maintenance of planning system – shared values and integrated approach are stronger developed at the regional/local level, so the planning process for the given disadvantaged region, including partial or full implementation, should stay there. It is obvious that appropriate managerial mechanism/system, capacity and skills, public support and interconnectedness with national plans should be in place.
Less centralized approach will be a significant key to regional growth, with less bureaucracy, more coherent regional policy, and better quality of programmes and projects, as well as it will win stronger public support.
How can regionas be more involved in research and innovation-sciense goes practice
How can regionas be more involved in research and innovation
– science goes practice
Wolfgang Fischer
Institute of Geography and Regional Sciencies. Karl-Franzens-University
Graz
Summary
1. Graz Declaration on Committing Universities to Sustainable Development
The European Union through the Resolution of the Gothenburg Council and the Lisbon Process has put itself on the frontline of the implementation of sustainable development in the global context. By this, the European Union has taken over a major responsibility to reach the UN Millennium Development Goals. The Bologna Process constitutes one of the most efficient means to realize this ambitious objective in the arena of Higher Education. On the occasion of launching the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development in higher education, an international conference on “Committing Universities to Sustainable Development”, was held from 20-23 April 2005 in Graz, Austria. The conference was jointly organized by COPERNICUSCAMPUS, the Karl-Franzens-University Graz, the Technical University Graz, oikos International, and was sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The objective of the conference was to discuss the role of universities and other higher education institutions in an overall societal transition towards sustainable development as well as strategies for the necessary opening of universities to society.
After the deliberations during the conference, the participants came to the conclusion that the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development 2005-2014 confronts universities throughout the world with a strong challenge as well as with new opportunities. As the location of academic education, universities bear a distinctive responsibility for the students and their professional and moral quality as future leaders in society and economy. As major contributors to research, they have to tackle questions which arise in connection with the transition of societies around the world towards more sustainable development paths. As significant societal actors, universities shape their local, regional and national environs and are therefore an important partner of other stakeholders, and society at large, for a sustainable future. All these challenges and opportunities require universities to re-think their position in society in order to meet expectations as well as to take full advantage of emerging opportunities.
Against this background, the participants in attendance at this conference endorse the following in view of the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development:
1. Call on universities to give sustainable development fundamental status in their strategy and their activities and to promote the creative development and implementation of comprehensive and integrated sustainability actions in relation to their three major functions – learning and teaching, research, internal and external social responsibility. By co-operating more closely institutions of higher education could share experiences and develop together inter- and transdisciplinary innovative approaches to sustainability in all their functions.
Universities are also called for closer interaction with other stakeholders in communities to better respond to their needs and requirements as well as to learn lessons from professional and life experiences.
2. Call on Ministers at the Conference of European Ministers responsible for Higher Education to be held in Bergen in May 2005 to use sustainable development as a framework for the enhancement of the social dimension of European higher education as well as to contribute to the attractiveness of the European Higher Education Area. The participants urge the Ministers to request the Bologna Follow Up Group to submit a proposal for criteria and procedures on how to integrate sustainability issues into the framework of the Bologna Process using COPERNICUS as one of the starting points for further deliberations.
3. Call on UNESCO as a designated lead agency for the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development, in co-operation with other relevant parts of the United Nations system, to support these efforts in the higher education sector and to promote and support international academic cooperation contributing to a better integration of sustainable development in the institutional mission and to see it to be part of academic values. UNESCO shall provide a critical partner in linking the European efforts in globally promoting sustainable development in higher education.
The “Graz Process”, initiated at this conference, will provide a supportive mean and a sounding board to integrate sustainable development into the Bologna Process and on the global level.( Graz Declaration on Committing Universities to Sustainable Development http://www.uni-graz.at/sustainability/).
2. Research at the Institute of Geographie and Regional Science
Research at the Institute of Geography and Regional Science is defined by the current
international scientific development combined with the interests of the department staff
members, which makes a wide range of activities possible but nevertheless puts the
focus on certain core competencies of the Institute. These core competencies are:
Sustainable Urban and Regional Development:
In this strongly application-oriented research field the following research topics are
currently being worked on:
- Strategic Planning Processes in Cities and Regions
- Evaluation of EU-Framework programs
- Analysis of Processes regarding the Local Agenda 21, esp. participation and
communication issues
Integrative Research in Tourism Development:
This is a traditional strength of the Institute and is momentarily realized within a largescale
project concerning tourism issues in Alpine areas. A further focus will be put on
tourism in Central Europe as part of an interdisciplinary special research program.
Geographical Environmental and Landscape Research:
The clear, practice-oriented focus here is put on applied climatology (agrarian, ground
and weather climatology, pollutant spreading). Besides this, projects in the field of
environmental management as well as glacier and permafrost monitoring try to work on
questions concerning the natural environment.
Environmental and Landscape Didactics:
This field of activity tries to focus on a target group oriented application of existing
knowledge in terms of environmental education. Concepts of nature and adventure trails
as well as the development of landscape guides belong to this field of activity.
Integrative Geographical Technologies:
As an important challenge in modern geographical research this field must be seen as an
integrative part of all other fields of research, but as well as an independent research
focus, dealing with the further development of various methods and the analysis of their
implementation. These methods are:
- Cartography (Design and Implementation, Media and Cartography etc.)
- Geographical Information Systems and Processing
- Geographical Remote Sensing
The Institute of Geography and Regional Sciencies has conducted a large number of
research projects on rural, urban, local, regional, national and European planning
matters. Selected projects:
70
- Interreg III B CADSES (2000 – 2006): “READY” – Rehabilitation and Development
in Mining Regions. LP City of Oelsnitz
- Interreg III C “Eco Profit International”. LP City of Graz – Department of
environment
- Rapid Expansion of Winter Tourism and Problems with the Summer (Western
European Tourism Research Project, Universität Exeter, England)
- The leading Tourist Regions in the Alps (Internationales Forschungsprojekt an der
Universität Grenoble, Frankreich)
- Österreich - Raum und Gesellschaft (Forschungsschwerpunkt des FWF)
Teilprojekt: "Produktionsstile im Tourismus"
3. Current projects
3.1. ECOPROFIT®
ECOPROFIT® Certification as Management Tool
· A private-public-partnership-model, developed by the city of Graz, to increase eco-efficiency in companies by using innovative integrative technologies and by cooperating with communes, companies and consultants
· Started in 1991, 1500 companies worldwide are ECOPROFIT® certified
ECOlogical PROject For Integrated Environmental Technology
Goals:
Strengthen the economic situation of companies by introducing pollution prevention
Improve the ecological situation of a region to achieve a sustainable development
Involve more and more companies of different sizes and from different sectors
Create some sort of sustainability network/platform
ECOPROFIT® provides “help for self-help” and assists companies in exploring their own business from a different angle.
ECOPROFIT for the University
ECOPROFIT® builds on a step-by-step plan consisting of an academy, a basic program and a subsequent club programConsultants and local authority representatives are trained via a ‘train-the-trainer’ program (academy)The acquired knowledge will be transferred to the employees under the organization’s guidance (basic program)
The ECOPROFIT® Club will guarantee long-term effectiveness and ongoing exchange of knowledge
3.2. Ready
The project includes four types of activities: local activities in the participating cities, intensive international co-operation, founding of an European network of mining cities and support for the local implementation of strategies and measures through scientific monitoring and coaching by experts.
The detailed activities are:
(1) work in selected regions to (a) install co-operative structures of regional stakeholders (regional management) to formulate regional development concepts, (b) identify and prepare key investments by feasibility studies, planning activities etc. or (c) place first investments. A mutual co-operation under the leadership of the local selfgovernment will ensure an efficient work. The objective of the first group of activities-impulse giving- is to initiate regional development processes in each of the involved mining regions. Participants, who prepare and make local/regional decisions, are the relevant stakeholders. These activities will contribute to the enhancement of the commercial, ecological and social situation in the participating cities and regions.
(2) strive for an intense international co-operation via expert workshops, seminars and public conferences (input), an interactive homepage with e-mail newsletter, leaflets and brochures, participation in international congresses and publications (output). The direct contact to multiplier organisations like the Council of Europe, national cities’ associations and various networks will create a “snowball effect” and allows for a broad discussion of the project and the results. On workshops, seminars and public conferences the experiences of all regions are compared and checked against international experience from outside the project.
(3) found a permanent network of mining cities (“Georgius Agricola”) which will continue and deepen the exchange and allow for trans-national lobbying. This activity is on one hand necessary for the trans-national exchange of experiences. It will support a learning process of local, regional and national stakeholders by promoting an exchange of views (mutual co-operation). On the other hand the network will foster lobbying for the needs of mining cities and for better funding policies as well as dissemination of project results which will raise awareness for regions in danger of further decline. On the base of the existing co-operation of German and Czech cities (Interreg IIC) a permanent international network of mining cities will be the result of this step.
(4) support the local implementation of strategies and measures through continuous consultancy by experts; transnational scientific monitoring will ensure that the strategies applied are in line with the international state of art. This approach has proven to be successful in the German model projects „Rehabilitation and Development Area“. The monitoring and coaching will be co-ordinated by the Institute of Ecological and Regional Development (IOER, PP 2, responsible) and the University of Graz, Institute for Geography and Spatial Research (PP 15). On the basis of a monitoring and coaching concept the 2 institutions will be responsible for the organisation, description and utilisation of the development process in all participating cities.
3.3. Competence Pool Water
The competence network “Water Resources and their Management” should forge close links with water related technology businesses, the water using industry and water research in Austria as well as in Middle and East Europe. Furthermore should the competence network work out innovative and integrative approaches and solutions to problems in order to optimize water resources management. Because of this further competence build-up – in the sense of an “activity with double dividend” – we can, on the one hand, accompany the development of the national water market on a profound basis and, on the other hand, it is also possible to market Austrian know-how actively on an international level.
The competence network “Water Resources and their Management”(KNW) consists of Austrian partners but because of the involvement of strategically important partners from our neighbouring countries Slovenia, Croatia and Italy it can even today get used to shape the European development area actively. Therefore this programme is very close to EU strategies and finds very high acceptance. K-net started on 1st. December 2003.
We would like to invite all those business partners representing regions who are interested in broadening their already existing specialist knowledge or to develop new fields. The research partners are therefore not only asked to enhance the field development with our business partners but also to implement the newly won competences evidently with the according business partners. A conservative teamwork between business and research with traditional roles would not fall under the proposition for financial aid. Neither would the use of simple routine know-how to solve regional problems. Joint Ventures should take place in Non- KNET projects outside the area of financial aid.
According to the financial aid guidelines it is also possible to invite foreign partners to participate. We are thinking mainly of those companies that could lead the way for Austrian business partners in their fields (e.g. irrigation, measurement and test engineering, engineering, tunnel construction). These companies can bring in a higher level of competence and this could lead to Joint Ventures with Austrian businesses.
The competence nodes are furthermore based on specific topic focus. Each competence node will work on certain topics, increase the permanent competence setup and the international competitiveness.
In the network participating business and research partners will be matched to competence nodes according to regional and thematic reasons. They deal with the execution of the research projects and in the case of business partners, they are responsible for the co-financing of the network budget.
KNET water is, on purpose, established as an open network. This means that after its founding other partners can participate and develop new network nodes within the described field on the one hand. On the other hand, the choice of research areas according to the innovation need, can get enlarged.
Project results will be processed in the individual network nodes. An information network results through that, which fulfils the function of know-how and information transfer and it represents an essential acquisition instrument for future research assignments on the basis of an improved knowledge and information level.
Added Value for Business and Research
The added value of this competence network “water” for each company lies without any doubt within the common presentation and operating of business and research:
The implementation of the funding program “KNET water” provides a stronger cooperation between business partners on the one side as well as university and extra-university research institutions on the other side.
Through the financial aid measures we provide an incentive for highly innovative research projects in industry, tourism, supply of drinking water and water for industrial purposes.
A continuingly progressing build-up of competence in business will take place through the individual network nodes, which unify project and information network. They are responsible for public relations, mobility and innovation management. Educational and training programs play thus an important role.
The focusing of specialist competences and the common presentation of several research and business partners result in a higher added value from R&D investments.
Therefore the competitiveness of our business partners will increase because research results get directly generated within the company and/or an intensive cooperation with research partners takes place and it is not necessary to buy those results via long detours (fairs, markets, etc.).
In the international framework the market can be better prepared through additional know-how and this increases again the competitiveness.
· Accompanying network marketing serves as an information track and brings advantages for the positioning at the international market.
· Strategic business decisions can get better prepared through the network and can more easily be made through the working out of field-related basic concepts.
– science goes practice
Wolfgang Fischer
Institute of Geography and Regional Sciencies. Karl-Franzens-University
Graz
Summary
1. Graz Declaration on Committing Universities to Sustainable Development
The European Union through the Resolution of the Gothenburg Council and the Lisbon Process has put itself on the frontline of the implementation of sustainable development in the global context. By this, the European Union has taken over a major responsibility to reach the UN Millennium Development Goals. The Bologna Process constitutes one of the most efficient means to realize this ambitious objective in the arena of Higher Education. On the occasion of launching the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development in higher education, an international conference on “Committing Universities to Sustainable Development”, was held from 20-23 April 2005 in Graz, Austria. The conference was jointly organized by COPERNICUSCAMPUS, the Karl-Franzens-University Graz, the Technical University Graz, oikos International, and was sponsored by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The objective of the conference was to discuss the role of universities and other higher education institutions in an overall societal transition towards sustainable development as well as strategies for the necessary opening of universities to society.
After the deliberations during the conference, the participants came to the conclusion that the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development 2005-2014 confronts universities throughout the world with a strong challenge as well as with new opportunities. As the location of academic education, universities bear a distinctive responsibility for the students and their professional and moral quality as future leaders in society and economy. As major contributors to research, they have to tackle questions which arise in connection with the transition of societies around the world towards more sustainable development paths. As significant societal actors, universities shape their local, regional and national environs and are therefore an important partner of other stakeholders, and society at large, for a sustainable future. All these challenges and opportunities require universities to re-think their position in society in order to meet expectations as well as to take full advantage of emerging opportunities.
Against this background, the participants in attendance at this conference endorse the following in view of the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development:
1. Call on universities to give sustainable development fundamental status in their strategy and their activities and to promote the creative development and implementation of comprehensive and integrated sustainability actions in relation to their three major functions – learning and teaching, research, internal and external social responsibility. By co-operating more closely institutions of higher education could share experiences and develop together inter- and transdisciplinary innovative approaches to sustainability in all their functions.
Universities are also called for closer interaction with other stakeholders in communities to better respond to their needs and requirements as well as to learn lessons from professional and life experiences.
2. Call on Ministers at the Conference of European Ministers responsible for Higher Education to be held in Bergen in May 2005 to use sustainable development as a framework for the enhancement of the social dimension of European higher education as well as to contribute to the attractiveness of the European Higher Education Area. The participants urge the Ministers to request the Bologna Follow Up Group to submit a proposal for criteria and procedures on how to integrate sustainability issues into the framework of the Bologna Process using COPERNICUS as one of the starting points for further deliberations.
3. Call on UNESCO as a designated lead agency for the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development, in co-operation with other relevant parts of the United Nations system, to support these efforts in the higher education sector and to promote and support international academic cooperation contributing to a better integration of sustainable development in the institutional mission and to see it to be part of academic values. UNESCO shall provide a critical partner in linking the European efforts in globally promoting sustainable development in higher education.
The “Graz Process”, initiated at this conference, will provide a supportive mean and a sounding board to integrate sustainable development into the Bologna Process and on the global level.( Graz Declaration on Committing Universities to Sustainable Development http://www.uni-graz.at/sustainability/).
2. Research at the Institute of Geographie and Regional Science
Research at the Institute of Geography and Regional Science is defined by the current
international scientific development combined with the interests of the department staff
members, which makes a wide range of activities possible but nevertheless puts the
focus on certain core competencies of the Institute. These core competencies are:
Sustainable Urban and Regional Development:
In this strongly application-oriented research field the following research topics are
currently being worked on:
- Strategic Planning Processes in Cities and Regions
- Evaluation of EU-Framework programs
- Analysis of Processes regarding the Local Agenda 21, esp. participation and
communication issues
Integrative Research in Tourism Development:
This is a traditional strength of the Institute and is momentarily realized within a largescale
project concerning tourism issues in Alpine areas. A further focus will be put on
tourism in Central Europe as part of an interdisciplinary special research program.
Geographical Environmental and Landscape Research:
The clear, practice-oriented focus here is put on applied climatology (agrarian, ground
and weather climatology, pollutant spreading). Besides this, projects in the field of
environmental management as well as glacier and permafrost monitoring try to work on
questions concerning the natural environment.
Environmental and Landscape Didactics:
This field of activity tries to focus on a target group oriented application of existing
knowledge in terms of environmental education. Concepts of nature and adventure trails
as well as the development of landscape guides belong to this field of activity.
Integrative Geographical Technologies:
As an important challenge in modern geographical research this field must be seen as an
integrative part of all other fields of research, but as well as an independent research
focus, dealing with the further development of various methods and the analysis of their
implementation. These methods are:
- Cartography (Design and Implementation, Media and Cartography etc.)
- Geographical Information Systems and Processing
- Geographical Remote Sensing
The Institute of Geography and Regional Sciencies has conducted a large number of
research projects on rural, urban, local, regional, national and European planning
matters. Selected projects:
70
- Interreg III B CADSES (2000 – 2006): “READY” – Rehabilitation and Development
in Mining Regions. LP City of Oelsnitz
- Interreg III C “Eco Profit International”. LP City of Graz – Department of
environment
- Rapid Expansion of Winter Tourism and Problems with the Summer (Western
European Tourism Research Project, Universität Exeter, England)
- The leading Tourist Regions in the Alps (Internationales Forschungsprojekt an der
Universität Grenoble, Frankreich)
- Österreich - Raum und Gesellschaft (Forschungsschwerpunkt des FWF)
Teilprojekt: "Produktionsstile im Tourismus"
3. Current projects
3.1. ECOPROFIT®
ECOPROFIT® Certification as Management Tool
· A private-public-partnership-model, developed by the city of Graz, to increase eco-efficiency in companies by using innovative integrative technologies and by cooperating with communes, companies and consultants
· Started in 1991, 1500 companies worldwide are ECOPROFIT® certified
ECOlogical PROject For Integrated Environmental Technology
Goals:
Strengthen the economic situation of companies by introducing pollution prevention
Improve the ecological situation of a region to achieve a sustainable development
Involve more and more companies of different sizes and from different sectors
Create some sort of sustainability network/platform
ECOPROFIT® provides “help for self-help” and assists companies in exploring their own business from a different angle.
ECOPROFIT for the University
ECOPROFIT® builds on a step-by-step plan consisting of an academy, a basic program and a subsequent club programConsultants and local authority representatives are trained via a ‘train-the-trainer’ program (academy)The acquired knowledge will be transferred to the employees under the organization’s guidance (basic program)
The ECOPROFIT® Club will guarantee long-term effectiveness and ongoing exchange of knowledge
3.2. Ready
The project includes four types of activities: local activities in the participating cities, intensive international co-operation, founding of an European network of mining cities and support for the local implementation of strategies and measures through scientific monitoring and coaching by experts.
The detailed activities are:
(1) work in selected regions to (a) install co-operative structures of regional stakeholders (regional management) to formulate regional development concepts, (b) identify and prepare key investments by feasibility studies, planning activities etc. or (c) place first investments. A mutual co-operation under the leadership of the local selfgovernment will ensure an efficient work. The objective of the first group of activities-impulse giving- is to initiate regional development processes in each of the involved mining regions. Participants, who prepare and make local/regional decisions, are the relevant stakeholders. These activities will contribute to the enhancement of the commercial, ecological and social situation in the participating cities and regions.
(2) strive for an intense international co-operation via expert workshops, seminars and public conferences (input), an interactive homepage with e-mail newsletter, leaflets and brochures, participation in international congresses and publications (output). The direct contact to multiplier organisations like the Council of Europe, national cities’ associations and various networks will create a “snowball effect” and allows for a broad discussion of the project and the results. On workshops, seminars and public conferences the experiences of all regions are compared and checked against international experience from outside the project.
(3) found a permanent network of mining cities (“Georgius Agricola”) which will continue and deepen the exchange and allow for trans-national lobbying. This activity is on one hand necessary for the trans-national exchange of experiences. It will support a learning process of local, regional and national stakeholders by promoting an exchange of views (mutual co-operation). On the other hand the network will foster lobbying for the needs of mining cities and for better funding policies as well as dissemination of project results which will raise awareness for regions in danger of further decline. On the base of the existing co-operation of German and Czech cities (Interreg IIC) a permanent international network of mining cities will be the result of this step.
(4) support the local implementation of strategies and measures through continuous consultancy by experts; transnational scientific monitoring will ensure that the strategies applied are in line with the international state of art. This approach has proven to be successful in the German model projects „Rehabilitation and Development Area“. The monitoring and coaching will be co-ordinated by the Institute of Ecological and Regional Development (IOER, PP 2, responsible) and the University of Graz, Institute for Geography and Spatial Research (PP 15). On the basis of a monitoring and coaching concept the 2 institutions will be responsible for the organisation, description and utilisation of the development process in all participating cities.
3.3. Competence Pool Water
The competence network “Water Resources and their Management” should forge close links with water related technology businesses, the water using industry and water research in Austria as well as in Middle and East Europe. Furthermore should the competence network work out innovative and integrative approaches and solutions to problems in order to optimize water resources management. Because of this further competence build-up – in the sense of an “activity with double dividend” – we can, on the one hand, accompany the development of the national water market on a profound basis and, on the other hand, it is also possible to market Austrian know-how actively on an international level.
The competence network “Water Resources and their Management”(KNW) consists of Austrian partners but because of the involvement of strategically important partners from our neighbouring countries Slovenia, Croatia and Italy it can even today get used to shape the European development area actively. Therefore this programme is very close to EU strategies and finds very high acceptance. K-net started on 1st. December 2003.
We would like to invite all those business partners representing regions who are interested in broadening their already existing specialist knowledge or to develop new fields. The research partners are therefore not only asked to enhance the field development with our business partners but also to implement the newly won competences evidently with the according business partners. A conservative teamwork between business and research with traditional roles would not fall under the proposition for financial aid. Neither would the use of simple routine know-how to solve regional problems. Joint Ventures should take place in Non- KNET projects outside the area of financial aid.
According to the financial aid guidelines it is also possible to invite foreign partners to participate. We are thinking mainly of those companies that could lead the way for Austrian business partners in their fields (e.g. irrigation, measurement and test engineering, engineering, tunnel construction). These companies can bring in a higher level of competence and this could lead to Joint Ventures with Austrian businesses.
The competence nodes are furthermore based on specific topic focus. Each competence node will work on certain topics, increase the permanent competence setup and the international competitiveness.
In the network participating business and research partners will be matched to competence nodes according to regional and thematic reasons. They deal with the execution of the research projects and in the case of business partners, they are responsible for the co-financing of the network budget.
KNET water is, on purpose, established as an open network. This means that after its founding other partners can participate and develop new network nodes within the described field on the one hand. On the other hand, the choice of research areas according to the innovation need, can get enlarged.
Project results will be processed in the individual network nodes. An information network results through that, which fulfils the function of know-how and information transfer and it represents an essential acquisition instrument for future research assignments on the basis of an improved knowledge and information level.
Added Value for Business and Research
The added value of this competence network “water” for each company lies without any doubt within the common presentation and operating of business and research:
The implementation of the funding program “KNET water” provides a stronger cooperation between business partners on the one side as well as university and extra-university research institutions on the other side.
Through the financial aid measures we provide an incentive for highly innovative research projects in industry, tourism, supply of drinking water and water for industrial purposes.
A continuingly progressing build-up of competence in business will take place through the individual network nodes, which unify project and information network. They are responsible for public relations, mobility and innovation management. Educational and training programs play thus an important role.
The focusing of specialist competences and the common presentation of several research and business partners result in a higher added value from R&D investments.
Therefore the competitiveness of our business partners will increase because research results get directly generated within the company and/or an intensive cooperation with research partners takes place and it is not necessary to buy those results via long detours (fairs, markets, etc.).
In the international framework the market can be better prepared through additional know-how and this increases again the competitiveness.
· Accompanying network marketing serves as an information track and brings advantages for the positioning at the international market.
· Strategic business decisions can get better prepared through the network and can more easily be made through the working out of field-related basic concepts.
LESSONS LEARNT FROM MANAGING STRUCTURAL FUND PROGRAMMES: AN ENGLISH VIEW
LESSONS LEARNT FROM MANAGING STRUCTURAL FUND PROGRAMMES: AN ENGLISH VIEW
Overview:
The aim is to identify key aspects of successful programme management, providing a basis for effective delivery during 2007-13. The methodology is to consider aspects of Programme management, based on considerable personal experience. Issues to be examined include:
The difficulties of keeping a balance between maintaining quality in interventions, while meeting challenging annual expenditure targets: successful delivery.
The contributions that formal and informal evaluations and a more rigorous approach to project monitoring can make to successful programme management.
The roles of the Managing Authority, the Programme Secretariat and partnerships in successful programme delivery.
Wherever possible, practical advice and suggestions, based on experience, and with a view to helping others to avoid difficult management issues will be offered.
1) Introduction: personal and organisational information;
I have been involved in the preparation, management, delivery and evaluation of Objective 2 Structural Funds Programmes since 1989. The current Programme cycle is my fifth. My present position is Team Leader, European Strategy and Communications in the North East of England Programme Secretariat, based in Government Office North East.
2) Background: region, programme or project to be presented;
The region’s Objective 2 Programme is valued at 746m euros (80% ERDF, 20% ESF).
At the time of writing (September 2005) the North East is the only English region to have met its three N+2 targets for 2005: ERDF and ESF Objective 2 and ESF Objective 3.
3). Delivery (1) the right projects
Experience shows that Structural Fund Programmes can be heavily over subscribed: demand for resources can easily outstrip supply. To help to balance the equation selection procedures are needed: many models have been developed, and a common starting point, in the interests of transparency, is the scoring system, with points awarded or deducted for a variety of factors. But there is a danger that numerical selection processes reward the best writers of applications, and not necessarily the best projects. This approach to selection should preferably be supplemented with a degree of subjectivity.
An alternative to open ended competition and selection is commissioning. This is a process whereby partners agree a specification for projects, and then Programme Managers go about the business of identifying organisations that are capable of bringing the right projects forward.
For this process to work, the partnership must have agreed a strategic direction for the programme – and this feeds back to the need to get the Programme right at the preparation stage.
4) Delivery (2): N+2
It is vital that projects demonstrate sound financial performance because there is a direct relationship with Programme performance: if the projects that make up a Programme are not spending to schedule then the risk of decommitment of funds under the N+2 rule becomes greater.
To avoid N+2 penalties Programme managers must ensure that systems are in place to identify projects that are not performing well, and be ready to provide assistance – in submitting claims for example – or take remedial action – including withdrawing support from under performing projects. Tactics that have been developed include the categorisation of projects as red, amber or green, with red projects being those that have missed a payment claim or are more than 20% away from their projected expenditure profile. This information needs to be checked every month, and steps taken to move projects form re d to green or amber. Where significantly underperformance is noted, new contracts are negotiated, and funds that are freed are recycled to projects that can demonstrate a good expenditure record.
5) Evaluation and Monitoring
Although Programmes are evaluated at three stages in the life cycle, the mid term stage is probably the most important. This evaluation is equivalent to a Programme health check. A successful evaluation will be hard hitting and completely impartial. It should draw attention to aspects of the Programme that are not succeeding and should conclude with a dynamic set of recommendations, to be maintained by the partnership. Failure to act on recommendations represents a failure to deliver a high quality programme.
The current mid term update is an interesting exercise in checking and validating performance data. Early results in NE England confirm that there are wide variations in the way organisations calculate outputs such as jobs, visitor numbers and SME turnover.
Informal evaluation work – conducted at the request of the partnership and looking at particular aspects of Programme content or processes is also a valuable tool in driving up quality.
Evaluation and monitoring are two ends of the same spectrum. A good monitoring visit will share the same characteristics of a successful evaluation. In recent experience monitoring has revealed where projects are seriously deficient, particularly when it comes to meeting the requirements of the SG Regulations in fields such as retention of documents, procurement and publicity. Failure on any of these fronts can result in grant repayment, as evidenced by recent audit visits. Monitoring is also an important component in the N+2 process, providing the monitoring team with an opportunity to look carefully at the realism of expenditure forecasts.
6) Role of Managing Authority
The use of the word “Managing” is vital: Programmes do not run themselves – the many actors in a Programme rarely see the sum of the parts but understandably tend to focus on their own project(s) or field of interest. It is the role of programme managers to bring the parts together into a coherent whole.
But successful management requires also flexibility and the ability to manage competing partner expectations while remaining broadly impartial or neutral in the process of securing funds.
A key function of the Managing Authority is to ensure that dealings with the Commission during the life of the programme are effective. In a successfully managed programme the Commission’s profile should be low – engaging the partnership only through events such as PMC meetings.
7) Proactive Secretariat: skills and experience
The Secretariat is the embodiment of the Managing Authority – and to manage successfully it needs to be able to deploy a wide range of skills in a proactive fashion. These skills should include expertise in regional and economic development, awareness of project appraisal methodologies, financial management (including accountancy skills) and dedicated expertise in publicity and communications and the cross cutting themes.
This body of expertise should not be confined to an office but should be deployed throughout the partnership, building relationships and maintaining a constructive dialogue with all organisations involved in the Programme.
Crucially, the Secretariat can not wait for things to happen, but must be involved in a constant process of tasks such as helping to develop the type of projects that the Programme needs, chasing and checking expenditure claims, actively monitoring as many projects as possible and disseminating best practice .
8) Role of partnership
While the Secretariat can take the lead in bringing the Programme together and ensuring that it is meeting its performance and financial objectives this can best be achieved by helping to develop capacity in the partnership so that organisations participating in the Programme have their own experts who can meet Programme managers’ requirements. Ideally every project should have its own champion – a nominated official who can guide the project through its life from pre-application to final claim stages.
Also, opportunities should be given for personnel from the partnership to become more aware of the Programme as a whole, through activities such as secondment to, or work shadowing in, the Secretariat.
9) The Future
The draft Structural fund Regulations envisage that many of the practices and themes of the current Programming period will continue. Certainly the well established principles of partnership, evaluation, added value, effective financial management and delivery will remain at the heart of Programme implementation.
But the future will be different. New levels of strategic context will sharpen the content and focus of Programmes; the removal of the Programme Complement will simplify matters especially regarding financial management whereby the ability to carry out transactions at priority, rather than Measure, level is very welcome. A question mark remains over the Performance Reserve: if it is abandoned then one of the most key justifications for ensuring that projects are delivering relevant outputs will be removed. N+2 will remain – and there is still much to be learnt about successfully avoiding decommitment.
10) Conclusions
To conclude, a definition of successful Programme management is offered:
“Ensuring that the Programme includes high quality projects, all helping to ensure that financial and performance targets are met in the context of a clear strategic direction that is supported by a partnership that is committed to meeting Programme objectives.“
Communication details:
Peter Smith - Team Leader, European Strategy and Communications
Government Office North East, Citygate, Gallowgate, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE3 4WHWebsite: europeanfundingne.co.uk E mail: peter.smith@gone.gsi.gov.uk
Overview:
The aim is to identify key aspects of successful programme management, providing a basis for effective delivery during 2007-13. The methodology is to consider aspects of Programme management, based on considerable personal experience. Issues to be examined include:
The difficulties of keeping a balance between maintaining quality in interventions, while meeting challenging annual expenditure targets: successful delivery.
The contributions that formal and informal evaluations and a more rigorous approach to project monitoring can make to successful programme management.
The roles of the Managing Authority, the Programme Secretariat and partnerships in successful programme delivery.
Wherever possible, practical advice and suggestions, based on experience, and with a view to helping others to avoid difficult management issues will be offered.
1) Introduction: personal and organisational information;
I have been involved in the preparation, management, delivery and evaluation of Objective 2 Structural Funds Programmes since 1989. The current Programme cycle is my fifth. My present position is Team Leader, European Strategy and Communications in the North East of England Programme Secretariat, based in Government Office North East.
2) Background: region, programme or project to be presented;
The region’s Objective 2 Programme is valued at 746m euros (80% ERDF, 20% ESF).
At the time of writing (September 2005) the North East is the only English region to have met its three N+2 targets for 2005: ERDF and ESF Objective 2 and ESF Objective 3.
3). Delivery (1) the right projects
Experience shows that Structural Fund Programmes can be heavily over subscribed: demand for resources can easily outstrip supply. To help to balance the equation selection procedures are needed: many models have been developed, and a common starting point, in the interests of transparency, is the scoring system, with points awarded or deducted for a variety of factors. But there is a danger that numerical selection processes reward the best writers of applications, and not necessarily the best projects. This approach to selection should preferably be supplemented with a degree of subjectivity.
An alternative to open ended competition and selection is commissioning. This is a process whereby partners agree a specification for projects, and then Programme Managers go about the business of identifying organisations that are capable of bringing the right projects forward.
For this process to work, the partnership must have agreed a strategic direction for the programme – and this feeds back to the need to get the Programme right at the preparation stage.
4) Delivery (2): N+2
It is vital that projects demonstrate sound financial performance because there is a direct relationship with Programme performance: if the projects that make up a Programme are not spending to schedule then the risk of decommitment of funds under the N+2 rule becomes greater.
To avoid N+2 penalties Programme managers must ensure that systems are in place to identify projects that are not performing well, and be ready to provide assistance – in submitting claims for example – or take remedial action – including withdrawing support from under performing projects. Tactics that have been developed include the categorisation of projects as red, amber or green, with red projects being those that have missed a payment claim or are more than 20% away from their projected expenditure profile. This information needs to be checked every month, and steps taken to move projects form re d to green or amber. Where significantly underperformance is noted, new contracts are negotiated, and funds that are freed are recycled to projects that can demonstrate a good expenditure record.
5) Evaluation and Monitoring
Although Programmes are evaluated at three stages in the life cycle, the mid term stage is probably the most important. This evaluation is equivalent to a Programme health check. A successful evaluation will be hard hitting and completely impartial. It should draw attention to aspects of the Programme that are not succeeding and should conclude with a dynamic set of recommendations, to be maintained by the partnership. Failure to act on recommendations represents a failure to deliver a high quality programme.
The current mid term update is an interesting exercise in checking and validating performance data. Early results in NE England confirm that there are wide variations in the way organisations calculate outputs such as jobs, visitor numbers and SME turnover.
Informal evaluation work – conducted at the request of the partnership and looking at particular aspects of Programme content or processes is also a valuable tool in driving up quality.
Evaluation and monitoring are two ends of the same spectrum. A good monitoring visit will share the same characteristics of a successful evaluation. In recent experience monitoring has revealed where projects are seriously deficient, particularly when it comes to meeting the requirements of the SG Regulations in fields such as retention of documents, procurement and publicity. Failure on any of these fronts can result in grant repayment, as evidenced by recent audit visits. Monitoring is also an important component in the N+2 process, providing the monitoring team with an opportunity to look carefully at the realism of expenditure forecasts.
6) Role of Managing Authority
The use of the word “Managing” is vital: Programmes do not run themselves – the many actors in a Programme rarely see the sum of the parts but understandably tend to focus on their own project(s) or field of interest. It is the role of programme managers to bring the parts together into a coherent whole.
But successful management requires also flexibility and the ability to manage competing partner expectations while remaining broadly impartial or neutral in the process of securing funds.
A key function of the Managing Authority is to ensure that dealings with the Commission during the life of the programme are effective. In a successfully managed programme the Commission’s profile should be low – engaging the partnership only through events such as PMC meetings.
7) Proactive Secretariat: skills and experience
The Secretariat is the embodiment of the Managing Authority – and to manage successfully it needs to be able to deploy a wide range of skills in a proactive fashion. These skills should include expertise in regional and economic development, awareness of project appraisal methodologies, financial management (including accountancy skills) and dedicated expertise in publicity and communications and the cross cutting themes.
This body of expertise should not be confined to an office but should be deployed throughout the partnership, building relationships and maintaining a constructive dialogue with all organisations involved in the Programme.
Crucially, the Secretariat can not wait for things to happen, but must be involved in a constant process of tasks such as helping to develop the type of projects that the Programme needs, chasing and checking expenditure claims, actively monitoring as many projects as possible and disseminating best practice .
8) Role of partnership
While the Secretariat can take the lead in bringing the Programme together and ensuring that it is meeting its performance and financial objectives this can best be achieved by helping to develop capacity in the partnership so that organisations participating in the Programme have their own experts who can meet Programme managers’ requirements. Ideally every project should have its own champion – a nominated official who can guide the project through its life from pre-application to final claim stages.
Also, opportunities should be given for personnel from the partnership to become more aware of the Programme as a whole, through activities such as secondment to, or work shadowing in, the Secretariat.
9) The Future
The draft Structural fund Regulations envisage that many of the practices and themes of the current Programming period will continue. Certainly the well established principles of partnership, evaluation, added value, effective financial management and delivery will remain at the heart of Programme implementation.
But the future will be different. New levels of strategic context will sharpen the content and focus of Programmes; the removal of the Programme Complement will simplify matters especially regarding financial management whereby the ability to carry out transactions at priority, rather than Measure, level is very welcome. A question mark remains over the Performance Reserve: if it is abandoned then one of the most key justifications for ensuring that projects are delivering relevant outputs will be removed. N+2 will remain – and there is still much to be learnt about successfully avoiding decommitment.
10) Conclusions
To conclude, a definition of successful Programme management is offered:
“Ensuring that the Programme includes high quality projects, all helping to ensure that financial and performance targets are met in the context of a clear strategic direction that is supported by a partnership that is committed to meeting Programme objectives.“
Communication details:
Peter Smith - Team Leader, European Strategy and Communications
Government Office North East, Citygate, Gallowgate, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE3 4WHWebsite: europeanfundingne.co.uk E mail: peter.smith@gone.gsi.gov.uk
Information/communication – lessons learned in Sweden
Information/communication – lessons learned in Sweden
This presentation will be about story telling. I have chosen this expression because I think it is often more to the point and easier to understand than Information-communication.
I will focus on storytelling to the media and by the media. What can we do, as officials, to help the media to tell some of the very interesting and thrilling stories that are to tell about the structural fund’s interventions?
There will always be brochures and leaflets and websites and advertising, but there is nothing like the media when credibility is concerned.
My name is Maria Evertsson. I work as a communication officer at Nutek, a Swedish state agency dealing with business development and structural funds. I have worked with EU-related issues since Sweden became a member in 1995. Before that I worked as a journalist.
My e-mail adress is: Maria.evertsson@nutek.se
I will divide my presentation into three parts:
The media situation
Success factors
Difficulties
I hope that you will get some new ideas and maybe a slightly different perspective on the important and interesting task to inform and communicate the structural funds.
The media situation
It is important to analyze the media situation of your country before planning activities towards the press. In Sweden the local and regional press are very important. Sweden is a country of newspaper readers.
Of course television also has great impact. And the radio. There are similar studies done that show what kind of programmes people watch the most etc. It has not yet been the case in Sweden but I know that other member states have actually produced soap operas with a structural funds theme.
In brief, you need to look at what your media situation looks like. And do not hesitate to investigate new approaches to working with the media.
Success factors
What does it take to make a good story or facilitate for the media to make a good story?
These could be boiled down to three main points:
Pictures
People
Plot
Pictures
Pictures are very important. You know what they say; a good picture says more than a thousand words. It is important to try to show the projects in their real environment. If you can provide good picture opportunities you are more likely to make it to the front page than if you don’t. Most things are better than to show a person behind a desk or behind a computer. Of course, if you do not have any other alternatives, at least make sure there is a European flag nearby.
Where pictures are concerned I would like to mention the fantastic photos on the walls of the DG Regio info.
They come from structural fund’s projects from throughout Europe.
I think they would make an excellent exhibition in airports.
I want to show you a couple of examples where the pictures have been crucial.
People
A good story needs people, main characters. Who is a good starring person in a structural fund’s story?
One is definitely the project manager. The person in charge of a project. It could also be the local representative of the structural funds. I have chosen to call this person a local hero.
And from a structural funds perspective there should be millions of local heroes across Europe. They all have in common that they are doing something good for their local community.
Other important main characters in a story are external visitors for example in connection with structural fund’s monitoring committee meetings.
The two of them can be put together very successfully.
And of course, the participants of a project are important.
Plot
What is a good structural fund’s plot? What makes your story interesting? Of course if there is suspicion of crime involved, it immediately catches the attention. One thing that we have tried is to deliver a press release with lists of projects that have been approved for EU-funding. The information is very brief; only the name of the project, roughly what it is about and the amount of money granted.
Another way of creating an interesting plot is to arrange competitions between projects. You select a winning project that will be in the centre of attention.
Difficulties
Dealing with the local and regional media is fairly easy. There are a lot of newspapers and they are often, not always, quite happy to be invited to press conferences. The national press is much more reluctant. The local hero angle is not that interesting. Neither is the list of projects. I have tried making press releases about the financial state of play for the structural funds. But of course that information lacks the flesh and blood that I have already mentioned as being reliable success factors.
There is also reluctance towards everything that smells propaganda. You need to be careful. And the terminology is not on our side. Try to explain to somebody outside the structural fund’s system what the function of the monitoring committee is. The EU-jargon puts itself as a filter between the messenger and the people he or she is trying to address.
I have no good solutions to the problems. The only thing I think is useful is to try to use as normal words as possible. And to try to put yourself in the position of the “normal” citizen every now and then.
Conclusions
Media is good from a credibility point of view – but a media analysis is needed. The media situation varies between member states.
To help the media to deliver interesting stories you need to identify people and plot. You also need to be able to provide good photo opportunities.
Local and regional media are, in general, more interested than the national press. Maybe you will have to choose.
And finally: think story telling instead of information/communication!
This presentation will be about story telling. I have chosen this expression because I think it is often more to the point and easier to understand than Information-communication.
I will focus on storytelling to the media and by the media. What can we do, as officials, to help the media to tell some of the very interesting and thrilling stories that are to tell about the structural fund’s interventions?
There will always be brochures and leaflets and websites and advertising, but there is nothing like the media when credibility is concerned.
My name is Maria Evertsson. I work as a communication officer at Nutek, a Swedish state agency dealing with business development and structural funds. I have worked with EU-related issues since Sweden became a member in 1995. Before that I worked as a journalist.
My e-mail adress is: Maria.evertsson@nutek.se
I will divide my presentation into three parts:
The media situation
Success factors
Difficulties
I hope that you will get some new ideas and maybe a slightly different perspective on the important and interesting task to inform and communicate the structural funds.
The media situation
It is important to analyze the media situation of your country before planning activities towards the press. In Sweden the local and regional press are very important. Sweden is a country of newspaper readers.
Of course television also has great impact. And the radio. There are similar studies done that show what kind of programmes people watch the most etc. It has not yet been the case in Sweden but I know that other member states have actually produced soap operas with a structural funds theme.
In brief, you need to look at what your media situation looks like. And do not hesitate to investigate new approaches to working with the media.
Success factors
What does it take to make a good story or facilitate for the media to make a good story?
These could be boiled down to three main points:
Pictures
People
Plot
Pictures
Pictures are very important. You know what they say; a good picture says more than a thousand words. It is important to try to show the projects in their real environment. If you can provide good picture opportunities you are more likely to make it to the front page than if you don’t. Most things are better than to show a person behind a desk or behind a computer. Of course, if you do not have any other alternatives, at least make sure there is a European flag nearby.
Where pictures are concerned I would like to mention the fantastic photos on the walls of the DG Regio info.
They come from structural fund’s projects from throughout Europe.
I think they would make an excellent exhibition in airports.
I want to show you a couple of examples where the pictures have been crucial.
People
A good story needs people, main characters. Who is a good starring person in a structural fund’s story?
One is definitely the project manager. The person in charge of a project. It could also be the local representative of the structural funds. I have chosen to call this person a local hero.
And from a structural funds perspective there should be millions of local heroes across Europe. They all have in common that they are doing something good for their local community.
Other important main characters in a story are external visitors for example in connection with structural fund’s monitoring committee meetings.
The two of them can be put together very successfully.
And of course, the participants of a project are important.
Plot
What is a good structural fund’s plot? What makes your story interesting? Of course if there is suspicion of crime involved, it immediately catches the attention. One thing that we have tried is to deliver a press release with lists of projects that have been approved for EU-funding. The information is very brief; only the name of the project, roughly what it is about and the amount of money granted.
Another way of creating an interesting plot is to arrange competitions between projects. You select a winning project that will be in the centre of attention.
Difficulties
Dealing with the local and regional media is fairly easy. There are a lot of newspapers and they are often, not always, quite happy to be invited to press conferences. The national press is much more reluctant. The local hero angle is not that interesting. Neither is the list of projects. I have tried making press releases about the financial state of play for the structural funds. But of course that information lacks the flesh and blood that I have already mentioned as being reliable success factors.
There is also reluctance towards everything that smells propaganda. You need to be careful. And the terminology is not on our side. Try to explain to somebody outside the structural fund’s system what the function of the monitoring committee is. The EU-jargon puts itself as a filter between the messenger and the people he or she is trying to address.
I have no good solutions to the problems. The only thing I think is useful is to try to use as normal words as possible. And to try to put yourself in the position of the “normal” citizen every now and then.
Conclusions
Media is good from a credibility point of view – but a media analysis is needed. The media situation varies between member states.
To help the media to deliver interesting stories you need to identify people and plot. You also need to be able to provide good photo opportunities.
Local and regional media are, in general, more interested than the national press. Maybe you will have to choose.
And finally: think story telling instead of information/communication!
The regional dimension to the Lisbon Process
Prof. Andrew Scott
University of Edinburgh, School of Law
Old College
Edinburgh EH10 4HX
United Kingdom
andrew.scott@ed.ac.uk
The regional dimension to the Lisbon Process.
The central argument developed in the presentation is that the governance of the Lisbon Strategy lacks a structured "regional dimension", and that this omission is a major weakness of the entire process. The resulting weakness is twofold. First, as a matter of achieving the substantive Lisbon objectives within the economic pillar, the absence of a structured regional dimension risks excluding from the strategy a range of sub-state governments, administrations and economic stakeholders responsible for devising and delivering those economic policies 'locally' which will shape the overall rate of growth of output and employment across the EU. Socio-economic development actually occurs at the local level, yet there is no EU-wide discussion on the best-practice approach to including local economic players within the Lisbon process generally, or the OMC governance arrangement specifically. Instead, the LS is essentially a "top-down" strategy. Second, the absence of a formal role nationally for local economic governments and related stakeholders to be involved in the Lisbon process risks weakening the legitimacy of the venture. The principle of subsidiarity asserts that decisions should be taken as closely to the citizen as possible. This principle is designed not only to ensure that policies are shaped according to differing local circumstances, but also to maximise the involvement of 'local' stakeholders in the setting the objectives and designing the delivery of economic policies. The OMC process which governs the LS makes little or no mention to this principle.
This presentation focuses solely on the economic, or "competitiveness" strand of the Lisbon process. We ignore the social inclusion and environmental strands, although certainly the arguments developed here can be extended to include these other two pillars of the LS. Our critique is presented in two parts. In the first part we consider the implementation of the LS in terms of the substantive economic reforms which it intends to achieve in order to promote the Lisbon objectives. In particular, we examine the role that local economic actors have in the economic development process upon which success in a number of the Lisbon targets depends. In the second section we briefly consider the 'legitimacy' dimension to the LS, and once again focus on the role of regional authorities in legitimating the sometimes problematic economic policy measures that are required if the LS is to succeed.
To date the Lisbon process has been dominated by national governments to the relative exclusion of regional authorities. Arguably this leads to two defects in the process: the first is a failure to successfully achieve a degree of policy learning or policy transfer at the level of national governments who largely remain unwilling to alter national policies in pursuit of a common (or coordinated) EU policy approach; the second defect is the presumption that Member State governments are themselves able to deliver on many of the policy reforms that are required to achieve the economic objectives of the Lisbon strategy. Within many domestic policy arrangements across the EU, competence for a range of the substantive economic policy instruments in question reside at the sub-state level and not the national level. The risk at present is that the potential role for regions independently to contribute to achieving the Lisbon objectives will remain untapped. For example, in a recent joint letter to Commissioner Verhuegen, three Ministers of the UK Government noted that "(T)he Lisbon objectives must primarily be delivered through national actions and structural economic reforms." While one could interpret "national actions" to embrace the development of a specific and distinct regional dimension inputting to the Lisbon Strategy, our view is that such a dimension has to be explicitly acknowledged and be an integral part of such "national actions" through inclusion in the revised National Action Plans.
It is clear from many documents that the European Commission is determined to mainstream the Lisbon agenda throughout its economic, social and environmental policies. This is a significant step towards improving the prospects that the ultimate targets of the exercise will be achieved. However, in itself EU policies only play a relatively small part in delivering growth and employment. The burden of responsibility remains with national governments. However, national governments remain unconvincing participants in delivering the strategy. The OMC system is failing, and the proliferation of national targets is threatening to worsen an already confusing picture. While injecting a strong regional element to the Lisbon process cannot remedy all the defects in the current procedures, it can alleviate some. In particular, we suggest (a) sub-state authorities have to be closely involved in national Lisbon programmes as not only have they better knowledge of local economic circumstances, in many instances they are the competent authority with regard to particular Lisbon-related policies: (b) both theory and evidence supports the contention that sub-state authorities are more likely to “learn” from one another through established inter-regional networks, most of which involve policy transfer in relation to economic development: (c) sub-state authorities and their associated parliaments and assemblies offer crucial conduits through which the policy reforms and measures required to deliver Lisbon targets can best be legitimated, and so raise the likelihood that these will be realised: and (d) social-economic development occurs at the level of regions rather than nation states, and sub-state authorities are better placed than national governments to bring into the Lisbon process the various economic and social partners who are the key stakeholders in the Lisbon process and therefore to offer greater prospect of its ultimate success.
In conclusion, the arguments developed in the presentation point to the importance of energizing the regional debate over the Lisbon strategy. Undoubtedly there are regions who are already heavily involved in the Lisbon process, and successfully so. It is vital that best-practice lessons are learned from those regions, both in terms of the structures through which their involvement takes place and with regard to the substantive policy measures that these authorities are implementing.
University of Edinburgh, School of Law
Old College
Edinburgh EH10 4HX
United Kingdom
andrew.scott@ed.ac.uk
The regional dimension to the Lisbon Process.
The central argument developed in the presentation is that the governance of the Lisbon Strategy lacks a structured "regional dimension", and that this omission is a major weakness of the entire process. The resulting weakness is twofold. First, as a matter of achieving the substantive Lisbon objectives within the economic pillar, the absence of a structured regional dimension risks excluding from the strategy a range of sub-state governments, administrations and economic stakeholders responsible for devising and delivering those economic policies 'locally' which will shape the overall rate of growth of output and employment across the EU. Socio-economic development actually occurs at the local level, yet there is no EU-wide discussion on the best-practice approach to including local economic players within the Lisbon process generally, or the OMC governance arrangement specifically. Instead, the LS is essentially a "top-down" strategy. Second, the absence of a formal role nationally for local economic governments and related stakeholders to be involved in the Lisbon process risks weakening the legitimacy of the venture. The principle of subsidiarity asserts that decisions should be taken as closely to the citizen as possible. This principle is designed not only to ensure that policies are shaped according to differing local circumstances, but also to maximise the involvement of 'local' stakeholders in the setting the objectives and designing the delivery of economic policies. The OMC process which governs the LS makes little or no mention to this principle.
This presentation focuses solely on the economic, or "competitiveness" strand of the Lisbon process. We ignore the social inclusion and environmental strands, although certainly the arguments developed here can be extended to include these other two pillars of the LS. Our critique is presented in two parts. In the first part we consider the implementation of the LS in terms of the substantive economic reforms which it intends to achieve in order to promote the Lisbon objectives. In particular, we examine the role that local economic actors have in the economic development process upon which success in a number of the Lisbon targets depends. In the second section we briefly consider the 'legitimacy' dimension to the LS, and once again focus on the role of regional authorities in legitimating the sometimes problematic economic policy measures that are required if the LS is to succeed.
To date the Lisbon process has been dominated by national governments to the relative exclusion of regional authorities. Arguably this leads to two defects in the process: the first is a failure to successfully achieve a degree of policy learning or policy transfer at the level of national governments who largely remain unwilling to alter national policies in pursuit of a common (or coordinated) EU policy approach; the second defect is the presumption that Member State governments are themselves able to deliver on many of the policy reforms that are required to achieve the economic objectives of the Lisbon strategy. Within many domestic policy arrangements across the EU, competence for a range of the substantive economic policy instruments in question reside at the sub-state level and not the national level. The risk at present is that the potential role for regions independently to contribute to achieving the Lisbon objectives will remain untapped. For example, in a recent joint letter to Commissioner Verhuegen, three Ministers of the UK Government noted that "(T)he Lisbon objectives must primarily be delivered through national actions and structural economic reforms." While one could interpret "national actions" to embrace the development of a specific and distinct regional dimension inputting to the Lisbon Strategy, our view is that such a dimension has to be explicitly acknowledged and be an integral part of such "national actions" through inclusion in the revised National Action Plans.
It is clear from many documents that the European Commission is determined to mainstream the Lisbon agenda throughout its economic, social and environmental policies. This is a significant step towards improving the prospects that the ultimate targets of the exercise will be achieved. However, in itself EU policies only play a relatively small part in delivering growth and employment. The burden of responsibility remains with national governments. However, national governments remain unconvincing participants in delivering the strategy. The OMC system is failing, and the proliferation of national targets is threatening to worsen an already confusing picture. While injecting a strong regional element to the Lisbon process cannot remedy all the defects in the current procedures, it can alleviate some. In particular, we suggest (a) sub-state authorities have to be closely involved in national Lisbon programmes as not only have they better knowledge of local economic circumstances, in many instances they are the competent authority with regard to particular Lisbon-related policies: (b) both theory and evidence supports the contention that sub-state authorities are more likely to “learn” from one another through established inter-regional networks, most of which involve policy transfer in relation to economic development: (c) sub-state authorities and their associated parliaments and assemblies offer crucial conduits through which the policy reforms and measures required to deliver Lisbon targets can best be legitimated, and so raise the likelihood that these will be realised: and (d) social-economic development occurs at the level of regions rather than nation states, and sub-state authorities are better placed than national governments to bring into the Lisbon process the various economic and social partners who are the key stakeholders in the Lisbon process and therefore to offer greater prospect of its ultimate success.
In conclusion, the arguments developed in the presentation point to the importance of energizing the regional debate over the Lisbon strategy. Undoubtedly there are regions who are already heavily involved in the Lisbon process, and successfully so. It is vital that best-practice lessons are learned from those regions, both in terms of the structures through which their involvement takes place and with regard to the substantive policy measures that these authorities are implementing.
Preparing structural funds programmes for 2007-2013
Preparing structural funds programmes
for 2007-2013
Presentation: Felicia DARELL
(felicia.darell@midi-pyrenees.pref.gouv.fr)
Tel : 05 34 45 33 12 – Fax: 05 34 45 33 04
Prefecture of Midi-Pyrenees region - Europe department - control unit
Contact:
Secretary General: Didier FRANCOIS
Control Service: Head of Unit: Claude SAINT-MICHEL
Prefecture of Midi-Pyrenees Region
SGAR, Europe Service
1, place Saint-Etienne
31038 Toulouse cedex
FRANCE
Website: http://haute-garonne.pref.gouv.fr
Introduction: Practice of structural funds in Midi-Pyrenees:
Presentation of the particularities of the region and the management of structural funds in 2000-2006 programming area
§ Managing structural funds in France
Level 1: European Commission
Level 2: Member State/National level
Level 3: Local Governement/Prefecture of Midi-Pyrénées: Mananing authority/control unit/Partnership regional and local partners
The organisation of the partnership differs according to the implementation stages:
• Objective 2 programme /managing authority: the Prefet’s responsibility
partnership with a regional authority, the regional council at different stages (from the preparation, to the management and the global grant procedure).
• INTERREG III A and B/managing authority: Regional council
French-Spanish cross-border programme: management/the Regional council of Aquitaine/role and responsibility of the Spanish authorities/the local government/the Prefet of Midi-Pyrenees, co-ordination role
Trans-national programme “SUDOE”: managing authority: Spanish authority of Cantabria partnership with the Regional council of Midi-Pyrenees for France and representatives of Portugal and United-Kingdom
Development of positive aspects and improvements to be made for the future generation
Tendency for 2007-2013 programming area: decentralisation and member states’ responsibility: an active control and audit system
1. Preparing structural funds programmes: Practice in Midi-Pyrenees
§ Positive aspects and improvements to be made for the future generation: necessity to co-ordinate structural funds policy with the framework of the state-region planning contracts
A stronger role for the regions and Partnership
shared management between the European, national, regional involving regional, urban, local and other authorities, economic and social partners and civil society, environmental organisations.
Decentralisation
The management of programmes being financed by structural funds is the responsibility of the member state. In France, we are in the second phase of decentralisation and the new legislation has mentioned the possibility of transferring the management of structural funds to the regions to the local or regional authorities for the next generation of programmes.
Audit system (2000-2006)
EUROPEAN LEVEL : European Commission DG REGIO
NATIONAL LEVEL : CICC (commission in charge of the co-ordination of all the verifications
LOCAL LEVEL : Prefecture of Midi-Pyrenees (SGAR : general secretariat for regional affairs)
At the local level, there are divisions:
· The managing authority in charge of the Objective 2 programme
· The payment authority responsible for certifying statements of expenditure
· The independent control division : This control authority is composed of 4 civil servants with specific missions (to control operations: 5% of total eligible expenditure):
The Member’s State responsibility/example of INTERREG III A audit system
2. AGENDA
September 2004 - March 2005: strategic study group working on the national strategic reference framework (national level: DATAR)
May - June 2005: regional debate involving the partnership principle
June 2005: regional contributions sent to the national level
September 2005: National presentation
November 2005: DATAR
December 2005: final version
End 2005: decision by Council and European commission
Beginning of 2006: Council adopts community strategic guidelines on cohesion
2006: preparation of programmes for period 2007-2013
1st January 2007: Implementation begins
3. MIDI-PYRENEES CONTRIBUTION TO THE REGIONAL DEBATE
METHODOLOGY
DATAR prepared an introductive document (preparation for the national strategic reference framework) and at regional level: regional debate on the 8th June with 4 workshops:
“ Innovation and entrepreneurship ”
“ access to transport services of general economic interest ”
“ environment and risk prevention ”
“cross-border, transnational, interregional ”
The Prefet invited the State services, local and regional partnership the 8th June 2005 for their contribution to the national strategic reference framework. Over 100 people, participated and were present at the seminar.
The introductive document from the DATAR was sent to all the participants a month before the seminar, the proposals for the Structural Funds regulations for the period 2007-2013 were distributed on the 8th June.
The following seminar is taking place in Toulouse the 20th September 2005
ORGANISATION
• Introduction and presentation by the Prefet, the vice-president of the regional authority (Regional Council), the DATAR and DG REGIO, European Commission
• 4 workshops: Innovation and entrepreneurship, access to transport services of general economic interest, environment and risk prevention, cross-border, transnational, interregional.
Innovation and entrepreneurship
- Reinforce research and technological development
- Themes such as R&D and innovation and direct aids to SMEs
Transport
Reinforce accessibility to competitive and economic sectors: rail for instance/priority could be given to connections with other regions and with Spain (transport in the Pyrenees, over 800 lorries per day, rail could be part of the strategy) - line Narbonne-Toulouse-Bordeaux or Toulouse-Limoges-Orleans-Paris/Sustainable development with emphasis on rail is a priority
Environment and risk prevention
Risk prevention: the notion of risk can be extended to climate risks, pollution risks (air... )
Midi-Pyrénées region : - major flood risk
- mountain zone/vulnerable areas
Cross-border, transnational, interregional
INTERREG IIIA accessibility (experimentations of rail: Latour-de-Carol), cultural theme : strong preoccupation
INTERREG III B: discussions about the SUDOE zonage
INTERREGIONAL co-operation INTERREG 3 C : Emphasis on co-operation economic sector (ex aeronautic sector /co-operation with Hamburg and Seville …)
Concerning the management aspect the division of responsibility must clear between the Member State, the region and the implementation bodies. In Midi-Pyrenees, no decision has been taken in this matter.
for 2007-2013
Presentation: Felicia DARELL
(felicia.darell@midi-pyrenees.pref.gouv.fr)
Tel : 05 34 45 33 12 – Fax: 05 34 45 33 04
Prefecture of Midi-Pyrenees region - Europe department - control unit
Contact:
Secretary General: Didier FRANCOIS
Control Service: Head of Unit: Claude SAINT-MICHEL
Prefecture of Midi-Pyrenees Region
SGAR, Europe Service
1, place Saint-Etienne
31038 Toulouse cedex
FRANCE
Website: http://haute-garonne.pref.gouv.fr
Introduction: Practice of structural funds in Midi-Pyrenees:
Presentation of the particularities of the region and the management of structural funds in 2000-2006 programming area
§ Managing structural funds in France
Level 1: European Commission
Level 2: Member State/National level
Level 3: Local Governement/Prefecture of Midi-Pyrénées: Mananing authority/control unit/Partnership regional and local partners
The organisation of the partnership differs according to the implementation stages:
• Objective 2 programme /managing authority: the Prefet’s responsibility
partnership with a regional authority, the regional council at different stages (from the preparation, to the management and the global grant procedure).
• INTERREG III A and B/managing authority: Regional council
French-Spanish cross-border programme: management/the Regional council of Aquitaine/role and responsibility of the Spanish authorities/the local government/the Prefet of Midi-Pyrenees, co-ordination role
Trans-national programme “SUDOE”: managing authority: Spanish authority of Cantabria partnership with the Regional council of Midi-Pyrenees for France and representatives of Portugal and United-Kingdom
Development of positive aspects and improvements to be made for the future generation
Tendency for 2007-2013 programming area: decentralisation and member states’ responsibility: an active control and audit system
1. Preparing structural funds programmes: Practice in Midi-Pyrenees
§ Positive aspects and improvements to be made for the future generation: necessity to co-ordinate structural funds policy with the framework of the state-region planning contracts
A stronger role for the regions and Partnership
shared management between the European, national, regional involving regional, urban, local and other authorities, economic and social partners and civil society, environmental organisations.
Decentralisation
The management of programmes being financed by structural funds is the responsibility of the member state. In France, we are in the second phase of decentralisation and the new legislation has mentioned the possibility of transferring the management of structural funds to the regions to the local or regional authorities for the next generation of programmes.
Audit system (2000-2006)
EUROPEAN LEVEL : European Commission DG REGIO
NATIONAL LEVEL : CICC (commission in charge of the co-ordination of all the verifications
LOCAL LEVEL : Prefecture of Midi-Pyrenees (SGAR : general secretariat for regional affairs)
At the local level, there are divisions:
· The managing authority in charge of the Objective 2 programme
· The payment authority responsible for certifying statements of expenditure
· The independent control division : This control authority is composed of 4 civil servants with specific missions (to control operations: 5% of total eligible expenditure):
The Member’s State responsibility/example of INTERREG III A audit system
2. AGENDA
September 2004 - March 2005: strategic study group working on the national strategic reference framework (national level: DATAR)
May - June 2005: regional debate involving the partnership principle
June 2005: regional contributions sent to the national level
September 2005: National presentation
November 2005: DATAR
December 2005: final version
End 2005: decision by Council and European commission
Beginning of 2006: Council adopts community strategic guidelines on cohesion
2006: preparation of programmes for period 2007-2013
1st January 2007: Implementation begins
3. MIDI-PYRENEES CONTRIBUTION TO THE REGIONAL DEBATE
METHODOLOGY
DATAR prepared an introductive document (preparation for the national strategic reference framework) and at regional level: regional debate on the 8th June with 4 workshops:
“ Innovation and entrepreneurship ”
“ access to transport services of general economic interest ”
“ environment and risk prevention ”
“cross-border, transnational, interregional ”
The Prefet invited the State services, local and regional partnership the 8th June 2005 for their contribution to the national strategic reference framework. Over 100 people, participated and were present at the seminar.
The introductive document from the DATAR was sent to all the participants a month before the seminar, the proposals for the Structural Funds regulations for the period 2007-2013 were distributed on the 8th June.
The following seminar is taking place in Toulouse the 20th September 2005
ORGANISATION
• Introduction and presentation by the Prefet, the vice-president of the regional authority (Regional Council), the DATAR and DG REGIO, European Commission
• 4 workshops: Innovation and entrepreneurship, access to transport services of general economic interest, environment and risk prevention, cross-border, transnational, interregional.
Innovation and entrepreneurship
- Reinforce research and technological development
- Themes such as R&D and innovation and direct aids to SMEs
Transport
Reinforce accessibility to competitive and economic sectors: rail for instance/priority could be given to connections with other regions and with Spain (transport in the Pyrenees, over 800 lorries per day, rail could be part of the strategy) - line Narbonne-Toulouse-Bordeaux or Toulouse-Limoges-Orleans-Paris/Sustainable development with emphasis on rail is a priority
Environment and risk prevention
Risk prevention: the notion of risk can be extended to climate risks, pollution risks (air... )
Midi-Pyrénées region : - major flood risk
- mountain zone/vulnerable areas
Cross-border, transnational, interregional
INTERREG IIIA accessibility (experimentations of rail: Latour-de-Carol), cultural theme : strong preoccupation
INTERREG III B: discussions about the SUDOE zonage
INTERREGIONAL co-operation INTERREG 3 C : Emphasis on co-operation economic sector (ex aeronautic sector /co-operation with Hamburg and Seville …)
Concerning the management aspect the division of responsibility must clear between the Member State, the region and the implementation bodies. In Midi-Pyrenees, no decision has been taken in this matter.
The Experience of Integrated Projects (Ips) for the renewed Community Structural Funds (CSFs)
The Experience of Integrated Projects (Ips) for the renewed Community Structural Funds (CSFs)
Abstract
The Campania Operational Programme shares the Community Structural Fund’s objectives to provide incentives for development throught a radical change in the programming and management of actions and stakeholder practices through Integrated Projects.
The Campania Region proposes its experience as an EU best practice. The added value of its Integrated Projects is:
a) balance between governance and government;
b) integration between funds (European Regional Development Fund – ERDF and European Social Fund – ESF) anticipating the machanisms for the new Structural Funds;
c) partnership process with local stakeholders, capacity building and transfer of know-how.
Weaknesses to be addressed are:
a) political orientation of partnerships;
b) difficulties in harmonising the timing of individual operations with the financial programming of the Operational Programme measures.
In this framework, the Campania Region will concentrate on defining technical requirements and democratic legitimacy for the management of local development interventions directly through Global Subventions. Moreover, without the limits of measures, the Campania Region will experiment mechanisms and structures to facilitate flexibility.
Abstract
The Campania Operational Programme shares the Community Structural Fund’s objectives to provide incentives for development throught a radical change in the programming and management of actions and stakeholder practices through Integrated Projects.
The Campania Region proposes its experience as an EU best practice. The added value of its Integrated Projects is:
a) balance between governance and government;
b) integration between funds (European Regional Development Fund – ERDF and European Social Fund – ESF) anticipating the machanisms for the new Structural Funds;
c) partnership process with local stakeholders, capacity building and transfer of know-how.
Weaknesses to be addressed are:
a) political orientation of partnerships;
b) difficulties in harmonising the timing of individual operations with the financial programming of the Operational Programme measures.
In this framework, the Campania Region will concentrate on defining technical requirements and democratic legitimacy for the management of local development interventions directly through Global Subventions. Moreover, without the limits of measures, the Campania Region will experiment mechanisms and structures to facilitate flexibility.
Practical guide for Structural Funds interventions
Practical guide for Structural Funds interventions
Background
Many memberstates have experience with Structural Funds operations. Yet this experience is not always in a practical way available for others nor is it transferred to other memberstates. This was the main reason to start a project to establish a practical guide. EIPA, the European institute for public administration and ERAC a specialised consultant in the Netherlands for structural funds interventions therefore took the initiative. This was made possible by the Dutch government in view of the exchange of experience to new memberstates.
Content
The guide provides practical step-by-step guidelines about all aspects of dealing with the Structural Funds on the programme as well as the project level, including tips and ways of dealing with the different issues:
- Structures and Principles
- Plans and programming (from the first step until drafting the programme documents)
- Organisation and programme bodies (description of tasks and responsibilities)
- Financial management and control
- Project development
- Project management
- Project monitoring
- Programme monitoring and
- Evaluation
The information is based on practical experience using the official guidelines. It goes beyond the guidelines and should make management in practice more simple.
Target audience
This presentation is interesting for people from the recently accessed countries (learning from best practice as well as for people working longer with the Structural Funds ( thinking about the methods used and possible improvements). It gives an overview of all important aspects and directions for the best way of dealing with these aspects. The guidelines are based on experience gained by developing, writing, managing and monitoring European funded programmes and projects.
Presentation
Luc Broos , director of ERAC will present the Guide during the session of the Open Days. He will go into detail with regard to the content , the use and the impact of the guide. A copy of the Guide is available for the participants on request.
During the presentation we expect a feedback and a lively discussion with the participants.
Luc Broos September 2005-09-08
IPM 440126
Background
Many memberstates have experience with Structural Funds operations. Yet this experience is not always in a practical way available for others nor is it transferred to other memberstates. This was the main reason to start a project to establish a practical guide. EIPA, the European institute for public administration and ERAC a specialised consultant in the Netherlands for structural funds interventions therefore took the initiative. This was made possible by the Dutch government in view of the exchange of experience to new memberstates.
Content
The guide provides practical step-by-step guidelines about all aspects of dealing with the Structural Funds on the programme as well as the project level, including tips and ways of dealing with the different issues:
- Structures and Principles
- Plans and programming (from the first step until drafting the programme documents)
- Organisation and programme bodies (description of tasks and responsibilities)
- Financial management and control
- Project development
- Project management
- Project monitoring
- Programme monitoring and
- Evaluation
The information is based on practical experience using the official guidelines. It goes beyond the guidelines and should make management in practice more simple.
Target audience
This presentation is interesting for people from the recently accessed countries (learning from best practice as well as for people working longer with the Structural Funds ( thinking about the methods used and possible improvements). It gives an overview of all important aspects and directions for the best way of dealing with these aspects. The guidelines are based on experience gained by developing, writing, managing and monitoring European funded programmes and projects.
Presentation
Luc Broos , director of ERAC will present the Guide during the session of the Open Days. He will go into detail with regard to the content , the use and the impact of the guide. A copy of the Guide is available for the participants on request.
During the presentation we expect a feedback and a lively discussion with the participants.
Luc Broos September 2005-09-08
IPM 440126
Decentralising Structural Funds' management to the regional level
Decentralising Structural Funds' management to the regional level
Decentralised programming = Decentralised implementation? Or, Why (further) decentralisation of implementation is a bad idea
Since programming will focus on the NUTS 2 level in the future, there will be a tendency to decentralise management of Structural Funds and Instruments to this level. This paper problematises the management side of this issue, arguing that decentralised programming need not automatically mean decentralised management of the programmes, and indeed that there are many reasons why, particularly in the new Member states, any (further) decentralisation of management is likely to have negative consequences. These conclusions are based on the findings of an institutional capacity measurement recently undertaken at 4 implementing agencies in one new member state (to ensure confidentiality, the results will be presented generically and anonymously). Ten criteria were used to measure capacity at existing institutions; these criteria were adapted for relevance in light of structural funds implementation requirements, and were: Governance; Management practices; Financial resources; Service delivery; Human resources; External resources; Monitoring of projects & programmes; Programme management; Administrative capacity for formulation; Management and Control of Programmes. In addition, an assessment was made of the structures for implementation of structural funds, with comparisons to EU member state institutions, on five criteria: structures for management; structures for programming; structures for implementation; structures for monitoring and evaluation; structures for financial management & control. The presentation concludes with some thoughts and recommendations for future institutional structures for implementation of structural funds.
The experience of the Management Organisation Unit of the CSF
STRUCTURAL FUNDS MANAGEMENT IN GREECE:
The experience of the Management Organisation Unit
of the CSF
Presented by:
Dex. Agourides
Director General
M.O.U. S.A.
http://www.mou.gr/ mailto:dagourides@mou.gr
EU Structural Funds in Greece
Greece is a peripheral EU country with no common land borders with other Member States. The major weaknesses of the Greek economy are infrastructure deficits, unemployment rate above the EU average, high share of employment in agriculture, low productivity (deficits in R&D, skilled workforce and business investment) and a lagging behind telecommunications sector.
The whole of the Greek territory qualifies as Objective 1 Region under the Structural Funds. There are currently 7 areas of intervention and 24 Operational Programmes (11 national and 13 regional). Key priorities:
Ø Infrastructure 56,5%
Ø Support to the private sector 21,9%
Ø Human resources development 19%
For the period 2000-2006, EU structural assistance to Greece amounts to a total of EUR 28 billion (Objective 1, Community Initiatives, Cohesion Fund).
Overall, under the regulations governing the 2000-2006 Structural Funds, there was a major transfer of responsibility to the Member States, while stricter conditions for financial management were put in place. This new regulatory framework was designed to improve effectiveness and transparency. In practice, however, the new system encountered a number of difficulties in Member States.
Implementing CSF Interventions
In Greece, CSF interventions and the tight regulatory framework required the establishment of efficient implementing bodies together with sound financial management at every level of Government. Therefore, a series of reforms in public expenditure management was introduced by law, incorporating detailed implementation procedures. Despite these reforms, several difficulties were encountered in the process of adopting the new implementation and monitoring system, mainly due to:
Ø Incompatible national systems with Community regulations
Ø Serious inflexibilities and inefficiencies in the civil service structure
Ø Inadequate coordination between government departments
Ø Lack of specialised human resources and know-how
Ø Multitude of weak and inefficient Final Beneficiaries
Ø Technological gaps
Ø Cumbersome procedures delaying implementation
Enhancing the management capacity of the Greek Civil Service
The Management Organisation Unit (M.O.U.) was established under the Community Support Framework in order to strengthen the management capacity of the CSF implementing bodies.
It is a non-profit making institution, operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, but is placed outside the civil service. The Unit’s legal status (Societe Anonyme) allows it to bypass the rigid administrative procedures and inflexibilities characterising the Greek civil service. It is governed by a nine-member Board of Directors and its workforce is made up of highly qualified staff, recruited from both the private and public sector.
The MOU has played a vital role in the setting up of the CSF management structure. MOU provided the following:
Ø Selection and recruitment from the private sector of a total 830 specialists for the staffing of 40 Managing Authorities and other administrative bodies.
Ø Deployment of five Expert Teams to support final beneficiaries with management weaknesses (“flying consultants”)
Ø Elaboration of numerous management systems and tools
Ø Implementation of intensive training programmes for staff involved in the implementation of the CSF
Ø Procurement of state-of-the-art office equipment and modern infrastructure facilities for the Managing Authorities
Ø Introduction of modern information technology systems
Ø Study and preparation of innovative management systems in view of the next programming period
Conclusions
The MOU is a unique experience of administrative structure for Greece. It combines staff from both the private and public sector and provides modern infrastructure facilities and high quality services to public authorities. It is a flexible and efficient unit, with high levels of performance, able to respond immediately to a number of urgent needs and requests. Its role is to complement and not to substitute the civil service by providing efficient technical assistance to the CSF implementing authorities.
The experience of the Management Organisation Unit
of the CSF
Presented by:
Dex. Agourides
Director General
M.O.U. S.A.
http://www.mou.gr/ mailto:dagourides@mou.gr
EU Structural Funds in Greece
Greece is a peripheral EU country with no common land borders with other Member States. The major weaknesses of the Greek economy are infrastructure deficits, unemployment rate above the EU average, high share of employment in agriculture, low productivity (deficits in R&D, skilled workforce and business investment) and a lagging behind telecommunications sector.
The whole of the Greek territory qualifies as Objective 1 Region under the Structural Funds. There are currently 7 areas of intervention and 24 Operational Programmes (11 national and 13 regional). Key priorities:
Ø Infrastructure 56,5%
Ø Support to the private sector 21,9%
Ø Human resources development 19%
For the period 2000-2006, EU structural assistance to Greece amounts to a total of EUR 28 billion (Objective 1, Community Initiatives, Cohesion Fund).
Overall, under the regulations governing the 2000-2006 Structural Funds, there was a major transfer of responsibility to the Member States, while stricter conditions for financial management were put in place. This new regulatory framework was designed to improve effectiveness and transparency. In practice, however, the new system encountered a number of difficulties in Member States.
Implementing CSF Interventions
In Greece, CSF interventions and the tight regulatory framework required the establishment of efficient implementing bodies together with sound financial management at every level of Government. Therefore, a series of reforms in public expenditure management was introduced by law, incorporating detailed implementation procedures. Despite these reforms, several difficulties were encountered in the process of adopting the new implementation and monitoring system, mainly due to:
Ø Incompatible national systems with Community regulations
Ø Serious inflexibilities and inefficiencies in the civil service structure
Ø Inadequate coordination between government departments
Ø Lack of specialised human resources and know-how
Ø Multitude of weak and inefficient Final Beneficiaries
Ø Technological gaps
Ø Cumbersome procedures delaying implementation
Enhancing the management capacity of the Greek Civil Service
The Management Organisation Unit (M.O.U.) was established under the Community Support Framework in order to strengthen the management capacity of the CSF implementing bodies.
It is a non-profit making institution, operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, but is placed outside the civil service. The Unit’s legal status (Societe Anonyme) allows it to bypass the rigid administrative procedures and inflexibilities characterising the Greek civil service. It is governed by a nine-member Board of Directors and its workforce is made up of highly qualified staff, recruited from both the private and public sector.
The MOU has played a vital role in the setting up of the CSF management structure. MOU provided the following:
Ø Selection and recruitment from the private sector of a total 830 specialists for the staffing of 40 Managing Authorities and other administrative bodies.
Ø Deployment of five Expert Teams to support final beneficiaries with management weaknesses (“flying consultants”)
Ø Elaboration of numerous management systems and tools
Ø Implementation of intensive training programmes for staff involved in the implementation of the CSF
Ø Procurement of state-of-the-art office equipment and modern infrastructure facilities for the Managing Authorities
Ø Introduction of modern information technology systems
Ø Study and preparation of innovative management systems in view of the next programming period
Conclusions
The MOU is a unique experience of administrative structure for Greece. It combines staff from both the private and public sector and provides modern infrastructure facilities and high quality services to public authorities. It is a flexible and efficient unit, with high levels of performance, able to respond immediately to a number of urgent needs and requests. Its role is to complement and not to substitute the civil service by providing efficient technical assistance to the CSF implementing authorities.
MANAGING STRUCTURAL FUNDS AND INSTRUMENTS
MANAGING STRUCTURAL FUNDS AND INSTRUMENTS
ADDRESSING THE ABSORPTION CAPACITY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES
Mr Stephen O’Sullivan
Assistant Secretary
Banking Finance and International Division
Department of Finance, Ireland
______________________
Introduction
The enlargement of the Union to 25 members and the prospective further enlargements present unprecedented challenges for the Union as a whole and for its constituent Member States. One of these concerns the successful and productive absorption of the very considerable volume of resources to be transferred from the Member States with above average levels of development to those which are catching up.
There are many aspects to the challenge of absorption. I will say a few words about the overall level of financial commitment involved and talk about the challenges that we in Ireland had to overcome in utilising the funding placed at our disposal from the Union Budget over the years. I am fully aware of course that what may have worked reasonably well in one particular setting does not necessarily constitute a model which all will find appropriate for their particular circumstances. Nonetheless, I do hope that some of the lessons that we ourselves have drawn from our experience of planning, drawing down and implementing the Funds will resonate with you.
My main messages to you today will be
The absorption challenges facing the new Member States are greater that those which we in Ireland had to address;
We overcame our challenges by concentrating on partnerships and planning. The main focus of this paper is around these points; and
Our efforts paid off. Thanks to the structural funding transferred to us by our fellow EU Member States, Ireland’s level of GNP on a sustained basis will be 2.5% above what it would otherwise have been.
The scale of the challenge
The scale of the absorption challenge facing the newer Member States is undoubtedly greater than that which we in Ireland had to overcome. Ireland joined the Union in 1973 at a time when our per capita income was around 60% of the EU average. Between 1973 and 1986, Structural Fund receipts averaged 0.9% of GDP per year. From 1987 to 1992 and again from 1993 to 1999, the annual average level of transfers doubled to 1.9%. Since then, these receipts have fallen sharply and now run at under ½% of GDP annually. Obviously, this will decline further in the next financing round.
A few simple points emerge from these data. First, the scale of the financial challenge facing the new Member States is double that which it was for Ireland, at its peak. Second, we in Ireland moved gradually up to that peak over a number of years. The step change in the level of funding inflows for the new Member States is much steeper than that which we had to surmount. Third, the inflows to Ireland were sustained for a very long period indeed. Between 1973 and 2003, Structural and Cohesion Funds receipts averaged 1.3% of GDP. This is a considerable period of time over which to learn from mistakes and to embed the funding flows into the mainstream of annual and medium-term budgetary planning.
Ireland was fortunate in other respects also. While some of those advantages are shared by a number of the newer Member States, others are not.
First, we are small. When it comes to planning and coordination, that helps a lot. Second, ours is a relatively centralised system and that helps too. In saying that, I am fully aware that the broad trend is towards decentralisation and devolution but there is no doubt in my mind that purely in terms of the effectiveness with which plans can be drawn up and integrated with mainstream macroeconomic management, a relatively centralised system has its advantages. And when you are dealing with flows of the order of 4% of GDP annually, their integration with national economic and budgetary planning is vital. Third, in planning to absorb and apply the Structural Funds, we were from the very outset building on a system and structure which was already there and which had to be developed rather than invented. Finally, the scale of the economic development gap which we were attempting to bridge was less than that currently facing some of the new partners.
These are just some of the factors which suggest to me that the challenges facing the new Member States are greater than those which we had to surmount. They are also some of the reasons why the Irish experience is not necessarily a model which will work for all. But for what it may be worth, I will describe what I think were the main elements in our relatively successful absorption record in the hope that some of the points will be of value to you. And it has been, I would argue, a good track record. During the 1989-93 programming period, Ireland was able to absorb something of the order of 95%+ of its Structural Funds allocation. For the 1993-99 Cohesion Fund round, we claimed in excess of 99% of our allocation. Under the current round, we had claimed in excess of 93% of our allocation by the end of 2003.
The keys to success – partnerships and planning
Successful absorption is not just about pulling in the money, it is also about using it well. If I had to sum up in just two words the key to Ireland’s story, those words would be partnerships and planning.
I said just a moment ago that a relatively centralised system has been one of the factors explaining our good record. Let me now explain and qualify that. The key decisions on the application in Ireland of available Structural Funding are made by central Government on the basis of recommendations made to Government by the Department of Finance. As this Department is also responsible for economic and budgetary planning, including taxation policy, this would appear to be a very highly centralised system of decision-making. However, it is necessary to qualify that view by looking at the process by which the decisions are reached and this is where partnership comes in.
Your first partner – the European Commission
The key partnership is of course that between the Member State and the European Commission. The many legal and political responsibilities of the Commission in this domain embrace regulatory issues, the efficient and proper execution of the EU budget and the consistent pursuit of an economic development agenda in individual Member States which is consistent with the overall goals which the Union sets for itself. This gives the Commission a central role from the highest political level down to desk officer level in influencing programme design, monitoring execution, evaluating the results and achieving financial closure at the end of the funding round. Furthermore, aside entirely from the legal rights and responsibilities of the Commission in this process, individual officers within the Commission are a rich and helpful resource and, in our experience, are of particular value to smaller Member States. So my first recommendation when it comes to successful absorption would be to establish and nurture a genuine working partnership at all levels with the Commission. There will be many occasions when views will diverge and when you may feel, sometimes rightly, that the Commission has got it wrong or is being unnecessarily inflexible but the core point here is that the Commission fundamentally shares your interests in terms of an efficient and effective application of the available funding. It is your first partner in this process. While the final sign off domestically on the National Plan is obviously made by the national Government, the Commission will have been a key partner at all stages in the development of the proposal put to Government.
Domestic partnership – the central Government sector
So also will the domestic actors in the process. The quality of the domestic partnership process is of prime importance in ensuring successful absorption. While the partnership with the Commission is a factor common to all Member States, the nature of the domestic partnership process will differ from country to country.
Domestic partnership starts within the central Government sector. In Ireland, the Department of Finance carries out many of the coordination functions at central level. We do not have a separate Ministry dedicated wholly to regional policy including Structural and Cohesion Fund matters. There may well be disadvantages to this, of course, but one of the advantages of Ireland’s set-up is that centralisation facilitates the integration of the Structural Funds with the domestic budgetary forecasting decision-making process. There is in my view a lot to be said for relatively centralised arrangements for drawdown, accounting, application and monitoring but of course systems of government differ and one size will not always fit all. However, in countries where the functions are dispersed across more than one Government Department, effective coordination along agreed policy lines is clearly vital especially at the planning stage.
Wider Social Partnership
The partnership between central Government and the regional actors can be seen as a special case of the wider process by which decisions are reached on the domestic economic development agenda. In Ireland’s case, that wider process is quite formalised. There has been in Ireland since 1987 a structured partnership encompassing Government and the representatives of the main economic and social interest groups. Originally conceived in the context of arriving at a national consensus on pay developments, the remit of this partnership soon expanded to include discussions across the broad spectrum of economic and social development priorities. Since 1987, six three year agreements have emerged from this process. This social partnership has made a significant contribution to our economic development. It has been used as a forum wherein opinions can be expressed on the development priorities which should be addressed in the National Development Plan and on results obtained. It has contributed to the building of a consensus on the contents of the Plan and has thereby facilitated the absorption of available Union funding.
PLANNING AND Implementation
Developing and perfecting the overall strategy is not sufficient in itself. Delivery structures play a major role in assuring a high level of absorption. I would see the important issues as these:
Early political agreement and broad consultation
I have already mentioned the quality of the partnership at domestic and EU level. In addition, I would emphasise the need for early political agreement for both the content and process of the planning procedure. This is particularly necessary to strengthen the ability of the key officials to deliver on the chosen strategy. Our experience is that political agreement should be concerned with the over arching issues and not with the detail of programme.
Ex-ante evaluation
A good ex-ante evaluation will help ensure that the operational elements of the programmes are consistent with the objectives. It will also improve the reliability cost and demand forecasts. Programme designers, therefore, need to fully consider the ex-ante conclusions. Despite our best attempts, it is not always possible accurately to cost schemes which will be implemented over a seven year timeframe. We have found that conditions will change with implications for the outturn on costs and demand. I am happy to see the initiative being pursued by the Commission and the EIB in this regard with their proposals for the JASPERS and JEREMY support programme for the new member states.
Delivery Structures and Administrative Capacities
Our experience suggests that it is better to build on or adapt existing delivery structures rather than to establish new ones. Inevitably, new structures take longer to develop the relationships and working modalities that are needed for effective implementation, particularly in the early years of a Plan. Existing structures, even if they have to be adapted, have operational resources and experience, and here I am speaking in organisational and human resource terms, which can be of immediate benefit to the roll out of programmes. Success lies in the effectiveness of administrators and managers. They need to have the technical skills needed to supervise programme execution. Officials should have active engagement with Commission officials.
Flexible Programming
The Commission will agree the financial plan at the CSF and operational programme level. There is little freedom on how the EU commitments are allocated across the years, as they must inevitably match with the Financial Perspectives. The programmes will take some time to get to full implementation status due to such reasons as the setting up of control arrangements, promoting schemes, and processing project applications. Therefore, in order to avoid losses under the N+2 Rule it is necessary to ensure that you have a mix of some high spending elements in the operational programmes. We have relied on some of these “winners” in the early years of implementation to ease the pressure on slower spending schemes and those that take more time to roll out.
Accessibility to Project Promotors
Too often good schemes fail because inadequate thought has gone into communication with the potential beneficiaries or the process for accessing funding is made too complex. You need to design schemes to be easily accessed by the target group for which they are intended. We have found it useful to provide resources to support the project promotor in preparing applications. This has the added advantage of ensuring an efficient project selection process by raising the quality of the applications.
Project Pipeline and Project Selection
I think Ireland has a number of useful experiences with respect to organising the project pipeline or stream. I like to describe this as parallel project development in that a number of projects are at different stages of development at the same time. In Ireland, strong central control ensured that only critically important and strategic projects were developed initially. However, given the certainty with respect to funding, we also pursued a policy of developing the next tier of projects in order to ensure no discontinuity in effort.
CONCLUSIONS
I’m aware that I have taken a broad interpretation of my brief here today. I have perhaps strayed outside the question of “Managing Structural Funds and Instruments” to consider some of the issues which arise at the macro level in tackling the question of how best to absorb available EU funding. In conclusion, let me say that
The absorption challenges facing the new Member States are greater that those which we in Ireland had to address;
The key to successful absorption is to focus on partnerships and planning;
The first partner is the European Commission whose desk officers are a rich and helpful resource, especially for smaller countries;
On the domestic scene, early political agreement is vital as are excellent relations across the main central Government agencies involved;
A relatively centralised system facilitates the integration of the Funds with decisions on the domestic public expenditure;
This has to be balanced by very broad genuine consultations with the key domestic actors;
On the planning side, good ex ante evaluation is the key;
Where possible, build on and adapt existing delivery mechanisms;
Focus on high spending elements early in the programming period;
Financial absorption is not an end in itself. What matters is physical investment and projects delivered. Project cost inflation can lead to a situation where the financial absorption record looks good but the actual content is less than planned;
Resource those seeking to access schemes, especially when it comes to smaller community-based and demand led schemes;
Do not wait until your plan is approved before you start thinking about your projects. It is essential to think of how projects will be developed at the earliest possible stage. Despite failure to agree the Financial Perspectives, all member states should be working on how to ensure a ready stream of projects for the new programming period;
Administrative capacity most be reinforced with ability, not numbers of personnel. The aim should be to use modern management methods and structures in support of the Funds. Members States can be innovative in their own right in this regard.
Thanks for your attention
12 October 2005
ADDRESSING THE ABSORPTION CAPACITY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES
Mr Stephen O’Sullivan
Assistant Secretary
Banking Finance and International Division
Department of Finance, Ireland
______________________
Introduction
The enlargement of the Union to 25 members and the prospective further enlargements present unprecedented challenges for the Union as a whole and for its constituent Member States. One of these concerns the successful and productive absorption of the very considerable volume of resources to be transferred from the Member States with above average levels of development to those which are catching up.
There are many aspects to the challenge of absorption. I will say a few words about the overall level of financial commitment involved and talk about the challenges that we in Ireland had to overcome in utilising the funding placed at our disposal from the Union Budget over the years. I am fully aware of course that what may have worked reasonably well in one particular setting does not necessarily constitute a model which all will find appropriate for their particular circumstances. Nonetheless, I do hope that some of the lessons that we ourselves have drawn from our experience of planning, drawing down and implementing the Funds will resonate with you.
My main messages to you today will be
The absorption challenges facing the new Member States are greater that those which we in Ireland had to address;
We overcame our challenges by concentrating on partnerships and planning. The main focus of this paper is around these points; and
Our efforts paid off. Thanks to the structural funding transferred to us by our fellow EU Member States, Ireland’s level of GNP on a sustained basis will be 2.5% above what it would otherwise have been.
The scale of the challenge
The scale of the absorption challenge facing the newer Member States is undoubtedly greater than that which we in Ireland had to overcome. Ireland joined the Union in 1973 at a time when our per capita income was around 60% of the EU average. Between 1973 and 1986, Structural Fund receipts averaged 0.9% of GDP per year. From 1987 to 1992 and again from 1993 to 1999, the annual average level of transfers doubled to 1.9%. Since then, these receipts have fallen sharply and now run at under ½% of GDP annually. Obviously, this will decline further in the next financing round.
A few simple points emerge from these data. First, the scale of the financial challenge facing the new Member States is double that which it was for Ireland, at its peak. Second, we in Ireland moved gradually up to that peak over a number of years. The step change in the level of funding inflows for the new Member States is much steeper than that which we had to surmount. Third, the inflows to Ireland were sustained for a very long period indeed. Between 1973 and 2003, Structural and Cohesion Funds receipts averaged 1.3% of GDP. This is a considerable period of time over which to learn from mistakes and to embed the funding flows into the mainstream of annual and medium-term budgetary planning.
Ireland was fortunate in other respects also. While some of those advantages are shared by a number of the newer Member States, others are not.
First, we are small. When it comes to planning and coordination, that helps a lot. Second, ours is a relatively centralised system and that helps too. In saying that, I am fully aware that the broad trend is towards decentralisation and devolution but there is no doubt in my mind that purely in terms of the effectiveness with which plans can be drawn up and integrated with mainstream macroeconomic management, a relatively centralised system has its advantages. And when you are dealing with flows of the order of 4% of GDP annually, their integration with national economic and budgetary planning is vital. Third, in planning to absorb and apply the Structural Funds, we were from the very outset building on a system and structure which was already there and which had to be developed rather than invented. Finally, the scale of the economic development gap which we were attempting to bridge was less than that currently facing some of the new partners.
These are just some of the factors which suggest to me that the challenges facing the new Member States are greater than those which we had to surmount. They are also some of the reasons why the Irish experience is not necessarily a model which will work for all. But for what it may be worth, I will describe what I think were the main elements in our relatively successful absorption record in the hope that some of the points will be of value to you. And it has been, I would argue, a good track record. During the 1989-93 programming period, Ireland was able to absorb something of the order of 95%+ of its Structural Funds allocation. For the 1993-99 Cohesion Fund round, we claimed in excess of 99% of our allocation. Under the current round, we had claimed in excess of 93% of our allocation by the end of 2003.
The keys to success – partnerships and planning
Successful absorption is not just about pulling in the money, it is also about using it well. If I had to sum up in just two words the key to Ireland’s story, those words would be partnerships and planning.
I said just a moment ago that a relatively centralised system has been one of the factors explaining our good record. Let me now explain and qualify that. The key decisions on the application in Ireland of available Structural Funding are made by central Government on the basis of recommendations made to Government by the Department of Finance. As this Department is also responsible for economic and budgetary planning, including taxation policy, this would appear to be a very highly centralised system of decision-making. However, it is necessary to qualify that view by looking at the process by which the decisions are reached and this is where partnership comes in.
Your first partner – the European Commission
The key partnership is of course that between the Member State and the European Commission. The many legal and political responsibilities of the Commission in this domain embrace regulatory issues, the efficient and proper execution of the EU budget and the consistent pursuit of an economic development agenda in individual Member States which is consistent with the overall goals which the Union sets for itself. This gives the Commission a central role from the highest political level down to desk officer level in influencing programme design, monitoring execution, evaluating the results and achieving financial closure at the end of the funding round. Furthermore, aside entirely from the legal rights and responsibilities of the Commission in this process, individual officers within the Commission are a rich and helpful resource and, in our experience, are of particular value to smaller Member States. So my first recommendation when it comes to successful absorption would be to establish and nurture a genuine working partnership at all levels with the Commission. There will be many occasions when views will diverge and when you may feel, sometimes rightly, that the Commission has got it wrong or is being unnecessarily inflexible but the core point here is that the Commission fundamentally shares your interests in terms of an efficient and effective application of the available funding. It is your first partner in this process. While the final sign off domestically on the National Plan is obviously made by the national Government, the Commission will have been a key partner at all stages in the development of the proposal put to Government.
Domestic partnership – the central Government sector
So also will the domestic actors in the process. The quality of the domestic partnership process is of prime importance in ensuring successful absorption. While the partnership with the Commission is a factor common to all Member States, the nature of the domestic partnership process will differ from country to country.
Domestic partnership starts within the central Government sector. In Ireland, the Department of Finance carries out many of the coordination functions at central level. We do not have a separate Ministry dedicated wholly to regional policy including Structural and Cohesion Fund matters. There may well be disadvantages to this, of course, but one of the advantages of Ireland’s set-up is that centralisation facilitates the integration of the Structural Funds with the domestic budgetary forecasting decision-making process. There is in my view a lot to be said for relatively centralised arrangements for drawdown, accounting, application and monitoring but of course systems of government differ and one size will not always fit all. However, in countries where the functions are dispersed across more than one Government Department, effective coordination along agreed policy lines is clearly vital especially at the planning stage.
Wider Social Partnership
The partnership between central Government and the regional actors can be seen as a special case of the wider process by which decisions are reached on the domestic economic development agenda. In Ireland’s case, that wider process is quite formalised. There has been in Ireland since 1987 a structured partnership encompassing Government and the representatives of the main economic and social interest groups. Originally conceived in the context of arriving at a national consensus on pay developments, the remit of this partnership soon expanded to include discussions across the broad spectrum of economic and social development priorities. Since 1987, six three year agreements have emerged from this process. This social partnership has made a significant contribution to our economic development. It has been used as a forum wherein opinions can be expressed on the development priorities which should be addressed in the National Development Plan and on results obtained. It has contributed to the building of a consensus on the contents of the Plan and has thereby facilitated the absorption of available Union funding.
PLANNING AND Implementation
Developing and perfecting the overall strategy is not sufficient in itself. Delivery structures play a major role in assuring a high level of absorption. I would see the important issues as these:
Early political agreement and broad consultation
I have already mentioned the quality of the partnership at domestic and EU level. In addition, I would emphasise the need for early political agreement for both the content and process of the planning procedure. This is particularly necessary to strengthen the ability of the key officials to deliver on the chosen strategy. Our experience is that political agreement should be concerned with the over arching issues and not with the detail of programme.
Ex-ante evaluation
A good ex-ante evaluation will help ensure that the operational elements of the programmes are consistent with the objectives. It will also improve the reliability cost and demand forecasts. Programme designers, therefore, need to fully consider the ex-ante conclusions. Despite our best attempts, it is not always possible accurately to cost schemes which will be implemented over a seven year timeframe. We have found that conditions will change with implications for the outturn on costs and demand. I am happy to see the initiative being pursued by the Commission and the EIB in this regard with their proposals for the JASPERS and JEREMY support programme for the new member states.
Delivery Structures and Administrative Capacities
Our experience suggests that it is better to build on or adapt existing delivery structures rather than to establish new ones. Inevitably, new structures take longer to develop the relationships and working modalities that are needed for effective implementation, particularly in the early years of a Plan. Existing structures, even if they have to be adapted, have operational resources and experience, and here I am speaking in organisational and human resource terms, which can be of immediate benefit to the roll out of programmes. Success lies in the effectiveness of administrators and managers. They need to have the technical skills needed to supervise programme execution. Officials should have active engagement with Commission officials.
Flexible Programming
The Commission will agree the financial plan at the CSF and operational programme level. There is little freedom on how the EU commitments are allocated across the years, as they must inevitably match with the Financial Perspectives. The programmes will take some time to get to full implementation status due to such reasons as the setting up of control arrangements, promoting schemes, and processing project applications. Therefore, in order to avoid losses under the N+2 Rule it is necessary to ensure that you have a mix of some high spending elements in the operational programmes. We have relied on some of these “winners” in the early years of implementation to ease the pressure on slower spending schemes and those that take more time to roll out.
Accessibility to Project Promotors
Too often good schemes fail because inadequate thought has gone into communication with the potential beneficiaries or the process for accessing funding is made too complex. You need to design schemes to be easily accessed by the target group for which they are intended. We have found it useful to provide resources to support the project promotor in preparing applications. This has the added advantage of ensuring an efficient project selection process by raising the quality of the applications.
Project Pipeline and Project Selection
I think Ireland has a number of useful experiences with respect to organising the project pipeline or stream. I like to describe this as parallel project development in that a number of projects are at different stages of development at the same time. In Ireland, strong central control ensured that only critically important and strategic projects were developed initially. However, given the certainty with respect to funding, we also pursued a policy of developing the next tier of projects in order to ensure no discontinuity in effort.
CONCLUSIONS
I’m aware that I have taken a broad interpretation of my brief here today. I have perhaps strayed outside the question of “Managing Structural Funds and Instruments” to consider some of the issues which arise at the macro level in tackling the question of how best to absorb available EU funding. In conclusion, let me say that
The absorption challenges facing the new Member States are greater that those which we in Ireland had to address;
The key to successful absorption is to focus on partnerships and planning;
The first partner is the European Commission whose desk officers are a rich and helpful resource, especially for smaller countries;
On the domestic scene, early political agreement is vital as are excellent relations across the main central Government agencies involved;
A relatively centralised system facilitates the integration of the Funds with decisions on the domestic public expenditure;
This has to be balanced by very broad genuine consultations with the key domestic actors;
On the planning side, good ex ante evaluation is the key;
Where possible, build on and adapt existing delivery mechanisms;
Focus on high spending elements early in the programming period;
Financial absorption is not an end in itself. What matters is physical investment and projects delivered. Project cost inflation can lead to a situation where the financial absorption record looks good but the actual content is less than planned;
Resource those seeking to access schemes, especially when it comes to smaller community-based and demand led schemes;
Do not wait until your plan is approved before you start thinking about your projects. It is essential to think of how projects will be developed at the earliest possible stage. Despite failure to agree the Financial Perspectives, all member states should be working on how to ensure a ready stream of projects for the new programming period;
Administrative capacity most be reinforced with ability, not numbers of personnel. The aim should be to use modern management methods and structures in support of the Funds. Members States can be innovative in their own right in this regard.
Thanks for your attention
12 October 2005
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